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HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Roger D. Blair,* Christine Piette Durrance** & D. Daniel Sokol***
Abstract: Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from
hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the
provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and
economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a
physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St.
Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the
district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts
undertake when analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the Article addresses the
question of how best to frame the acquisition of a physician group by a hospital—is the
merger horizontal, vertical, or potentially both? In undertaking this analysis the Article
examines the broader issue of the treatment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in
antitrust law. ACOs are short of full integration and as such, a potential contractual
alternative for hospitals and physician groups to an acquisition. A hospital acquisition of a
physician practice also has implications for how to view competitive effects in the context of
ACOs. Indeed, in St. Luke’s the Ninth Circuit suggests that integration short of full merger
was a possible alternative. Second, the Article examines the justification for integration as a
way to address countervailing power in health care, the reduction of transaction costs, and
potential cost and quality efficiencies. Third, the Article applies the economics of these
issues to merger case law generally and specifically to the St. Luke’s decision. Ultimately, the
Article finds the economic analysis of the Ninth Circuit lacking. Finally, the Article offers
policy implications of the decision and concludes with some suggestions to improve health
care antitrust analysis in practice for litigated cases to make such analysis better follow
economic principles.
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INTRODUCTION
Case developments in recent years have renewed attention on the
antitrust implications of health care mergers. This attention is
particularly important given the current trend of government victories
against merging parties in merger challenges.1 The United States

1. Lisa Jose Fales & Paul Feinstein, How to Turn a Losing Streak into Wins: The FTC and
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Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System,
Inc.2 was the result of a successful challenge of the anti-competitive
merger of two hospitals in Georgia that attempted to shield the merger
via state action.3 While the Supreme Court has not ruled in decades on
the substantive aspects of antitrust mergers, two recent circuit court
antitrust health care cases have received significant attention—
ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. FTC4 in the Sixth Circuit and Saint
Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.5
(St. Luke’s) in the Ninth Circuit.
Efficiencies, known in the business world as synergies,6 play an
important role in justifying mergers. By efficiencies, we mean decreases
in price, increases in quality and/or output, or increases in innovation.7
Because the ProMedica district court found no efficiencies in the
transaction, that case is, from a doctrinal standpoint, less interesting than
the St. Luke’s decision in the Ninth Circuit that found both procompetitive (efficiencies) and anti-competitive (monopoly power)
effects present in the merger.8 The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the
district court’s decision to enjoin the merger.9 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit had the opportunity to undertake a serious economic analysis of
the merger and to clean up dated case law that has failed to incorporate
rigorous economic analysis of efficiencies and other competitive effects.
Unfortunately, irrespective of the outcome, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
was lacking. A more rigorous analysis would have provided guidance to
improve case law for future courts. It also would bring predictability to
merger cases decided in the shadow of the law in terms of merger
planning for hospital acquisitions of physician groups, hospitals
acquisitions of other hospitals, and for negotiations between merging
parties and antitrust enforcers more generally. The lack of economically
Hospital Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 31, 31.
2. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).
3. Id.
4. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
5. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775 (9th Cir. 2015).
6. See, e.g., Michael Goold & Andrew Campbell, Desperately Seeking Synergy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 131, 143 (“When synergy is well managed, it can be a boon, creating
additional value with existing resources.”).
7. Howard Shelanski, Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 451, 451 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel
Sokol eds., 2015).
8. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786–92.
9. Id. at 793.
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informed case law in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to clarify merger
law in light of the Supreme Court’s absence in merger case law
development.10
In the St. Luke’s case, St. Luke’s Health System (St. Luke’s) sought to
acquire the Saltzer Medical Group (Saltzer).11 Saltzer was the largest
independent multi-specialty physician group in Idaho.12 St. Luke’s
already had integrated eight primary care physicians within its Nampa
hospital system.13 The combination of Saltzer’s sixteen primary care
physicians and St. Luke’s eight primary care physicians raised antitrust
concerns because the combined entity would control eighty percent of
the adult primary care physicians in the Nampa area.14 Private plaintiffs
brought suit to enjoin the merger under both federal and state antitrust
laws.15 Subsequently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
State of Idaho also sought to enjoin the merger.16 The district court
consolidated the actions and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.17 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.18
The St. Luke’s decision is based on a changing reality in health care.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA)19 has served as the impetus toward
increased health care consolidation for hospitals.20 Acquisitions by

10. For a discussion of the development of antitrust merger case law, see generally Hillary
Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2039
(2015).
11. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781–82.
12. Id. at 781.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 782.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 793.
19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see also Leemore Dafny et al.,
Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry, 102
AM. ECON. REV. 1161 (2012) (providing an economic analysis of the changing health care
landscape of which the ACA is a part).
20. Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows Challenges
to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699 (2010) (warning that incentives to charge higher rates
will create increased consolidation); David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market
Share, and Consolidation, 310 JAMA 1964, 1964 (2013) (“A large reduction in use of inpatient
care combined with the incentives in the Affordable Care Act is leading to significant consolidation
in the hospital industry.”); Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to
Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (2014) (“The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has unleashed a
merger frenzy, with hospitals scrambling to shore up their market positions, improve operational
efficiency, and create organizations capable of managing population health.”).
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hospitals of physician groups are also on the rise.21 In 2015, health care
spending was $3.1 trillion.22 The largest portion of health care
expenditure remains hospital services, at more than five percent of
GDP.23 Health care costs, therefore, are a significant policy issue and
ways to reduce costs (and increase quality of care) remain critical to the
U.S. economic outlook going forward.
Additional consolidation is inevitable,24 but antitrust enforcement
offers no clear solutions. Getting the antitrust analysis wrong can have
significant effects—in hospital mergers, post-merger price increases that
may be as high as forty to fifty percent of pre-merger costs.25 We believe
that health care will remain a fixture in antitrust into the foreseeable
future. This is particularly true for health care mergers. Understanding
St. Luke’s in light of these challenges in health care suggests that the
stakes in health care merger cases are significant. Courts must be more
effective and sophisticated in their guidance to better shape the changing
health care landscape.26
This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of the St.
Luke’s decision—the type of analysis that the district court and Ninth
Circuit should have taken and that we hope future courts will take when
analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the Article addresses
the question of how best to frame an acquisition of a physician group by
a hospital—is the merger horizontal, vertical, or potentially both? In
undertaking this analysis, the Article examines the broader issue of the
treatment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in antitrust law.
21. See, e.g., Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Hospital Acquisition of Physician Practices
on Referral Patterns, 25 HEALTH ECON. 439 (2015) (published online by Wiley Online Library)
(providing a case study of such acquisitions).
22. Tami Luhby, Health Care Spending Expected to Grow Faster, CNN MONEY (July 28, 2015,
7:36
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/news/economy/health-care-spending/
[https://perma.cc/3QNH-53RP].
23. Christopher Garmon, The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening Methods (FTC Bureau of
Econ., Working Paper No. 326, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/accuracy-hospital-mergerscreening-methods [https://perma.cc/3GU7-J9KW].
24. Paul B. Ginsburg & L. Gregory Pawlson, Seeking Lower Prices Where Providers Are
Consolidated: An Examination of Market and Policy Strategies, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1067, 1067
(2014).
25. Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and
Policy Maze, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1088, 1089 (2014).
26. In the area of hospital acquisitions of physician groups, for the most part, such acquisitions
fall outside the reporting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
Consequently, the antitrust agencies typically find out about mergers after the fact, which makes
divestiture remedies more difficult given the post-merger consummation. See Dionne Lomax, A
History of Evanston and Analysis of the Merger Remedy, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, May 27,
2008 (discussing the Evanston remedy).
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Vertical integration via ownership means that a hospital and its
physicians are within the same ownership umbrella and fully integrated
both financially and clinically. ACOs are short of full integration and as
such, are a potential alternative to acquisition for hospitals and physician
groups through some amount of contractual integration short of
ownership. A hospital acquisition of a physician practice has
implications beyond the merger context. Such a merger has
repercussions more broadly on how to view issues of competitive effects
in the context of ACOs. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s suggested
integration short of full merger as a possible alternative to an
anticompetitive merger.27 Second, the Article examines the justification
for integration as a way to address countervailing power in health care,
the reduction of transaction costs, and cost and quality efficiencies.
Third, the Article applies the economics of these issues to merger case
law generally and specifically to the St. Luke’s decision. Ultimately, the
Article finds the economic analysis of the Ninth Circuit lacking. Finally,
the Article offers policy implications of the decision and concludes with
some suggestions to improve health care antitrust analysis in practice for
litigated cases to make such analysis better comport with economic
principles.
I.

HOSPITAL ACQUISITIONS OF PHYSICIAN GROUPS:
HORIZONTAL, VERTICAL, OR BOTH?

Hospital acquisitions of physician groups implicate both horizontal
(such as the merger of two direct competitors)28 and vertical (such as the
merger of complimentary products within the production or distribution
chain)29 issues in antitrust merger law. While there have been many
litigated merger decisions based on horizontal theories of harm, there
has not been a vertical merger case decided before a circuit court since
198730 and no Supreme Court vertical merger cases since 1972.31 As a
result, the contours of what might be at stake in such a case remain
relatively unclear in vertical merger cases compared to horizontal
27. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791
n.15 (9th Cir. 2015).
28. See generally Bryan Keating & Robert D. Willig, Unilateral Effects, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 466.
29. See generally Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 551.
30. Alta. Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987); see
also Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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mergers. Unfortunately, the St. Luke’s decision reached the horizontal
theory of harm regarding a concentration of physician groups and did
not address the vertical issues.32 We focus on the vertical issues in both
law and economics below to address the sorts of questions that the St.
Luke’s Ninth Circuit court should have addressed. We note that the
implications of St. Luke’s are not limited merely to mergers that have
both horizontal and vertical elements to them. Instead, the wider
implications of the decision impact ACOs more generally, a form of
integration short of merger.
The antitrust concern with mergers is that the combined firm will be
able to raise prices or reduce quality or innovation unilaterally or via
coordinated effects post-merger.33 This Part examines both types of
concerns in the context of hospital acquisitions of physician groups.
Such acquisitions involve behavior that has both vertical and horizontal
elements. The behavior is vertical in that the acquisition provides
complementary services of hospitals and physicians. The horizontal
element is that the hospital may already have physicians in the same
specialty, which would lead to a merger of otherwise competing
practices. A similar analysis can be undertaken for behavior short of
merger, under ACOs.34 This analysis of ACO behavior is important,
because courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s, suggest that
efficiencies could be achieved short of a merger,35 which might
implicate ACOs.
A.

Vertical Merger Law

Vertical mergers often present more difficult challenges than
horizontal mergers in antitrust case law. That is because, as with vertical
conduct, vertical mergers are presumed to be pro-competitive due to the
efficiencies that they generate.36 The exact standards of the legal test in
32. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, Saint Alphonsus Med.
Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW,
2014 WL 407446, at *14 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015)), 2012 WL
5882652.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRK7-5J2L].
34. For an economic analysis of ACOs, see H.E. Frech III et al., Market Power, Transaction
Costs, and the Entry of Accountable Care Organizations in Health Care, 47 REV. IND. ORG. 167,
167–68 (2015) (finding physician concentration by organization has marginal effect but that
physician geographic concentration leads to less ACO entry).
35. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *14.
36. Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
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case law to evaluate the effects of vertical mergers is less well developed
than horizontal mergers. Indeed, the last time that the Supreme Court
addressed a vertical merger case was 1972.37 Prior vertical merger
decisions, most notably Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,38 were written
during an era in which fairness and other non-economic based concerns
motivated antitrust outcomes.39 During this era, the U.S. Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) 1968 Merger Guidelines also included a discussion on
vertical mergers, with a viewpoint to protect competitors over
competition.40
Though case law and the DOJ Guidelines of the 1960s and 1970s
incorrectly showed hostility to vertical merger policy,41 the antitrust
concern that they purportedly were based on—that of foreclosure—is
nevertheless a credible concern in examining vertical mergers.42 A
number of more recent cases in which deals have been abandoned or
conditioned suggest that there may be situations in which the concern of
foreclosure could present an anti-competitive problem, as we note
below. This includes where the upstream and downstream markets
would be highly concentrated post-merger, and where potential inputs or
where distribution channels may not be supplied to downstream rivals,
as we discuss below in Part II.
The government recognized the concern with the possibility of
foreclosure in a vertical merger context in the 1984 Merger Guidelines,43
although under narrow circumstances.44 Because of a very dated set of

Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 218 (2005). But see JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER
CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015) (suggesting that
U.S. antitrust policy has been too lax in a number of vertical merger cases).
37. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957).
39. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust
Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2527–29 (2013); D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between
Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2015).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 8–10 (1968), reprinted in 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) ¶ 4510 (Aug. 9, 1982) [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES],
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSB3B472].
41. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2058–59.
42. See generally Salinger, supra note 29.
43. 1984
Merger
Guidelines,
49
Fed.
Reg.
26,823
(June
29,
1984),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/242DTM5K].
44. Id. at 26,835, § 4.21.
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cases, the courts have not offered much in the form of guidance of how
to address efficiencies in vertical mergers.45 However, statements by
senior officials at both agencies suggest that such efficiencies play a role
in vertical merger analysis.46
The U.S. antitrust agencies have challenged vertical mergers based on
a vertical foreclosure theory in recent years, causing some transactions
to be modified or abandoned. These include Ticketmaster/LiveNation,47
Google/ITA,48 and Comcast/Time Warner,49 among others. Similarly,
the DOJ’s Policy Guide to Merger Remedies addressed the potential
harm of vertical mergers, noting that “vertical mergers can create
changed incentives and enhance the ability of the merged firm to impair
the competitive process.”50
A general discussion of vertical mergers sets the stage for an
application of vertical merger analysis in the context for St. Luke’s. The
case presented a possible framing of the vertical case in which a hospital
sought to acquire an unaffiliated physician group.51 This is what the
private plaintiffs in the case alleged in their complaint. The private
plaintiffs noted that, “St. Luke’s will gain a near monopoly share in the
Nampa, Idaho market for adult primary care physician services market.
It will continue its practice of foreclosing virtually all competition for
the hospital admissions of the physician practices it acquires.”52 Put
differently, the integration of the physicians group into St. Luke’s would
mean that there would be a lack of referrals to competing hospitals.
Consequently, there would be a reduction in competition for both
45. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 387 n.380 (7th ed. 2013) (compiling a list of
antitrust cases).
46. Id. at 391–92.
47. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-cv00139, 2010 WL 5699134 (D.D.C. July 30, 2010), 2010 WL 975407, http://www.justice.gov/atr/
case-document/file/513376/download [https://perma.cc/8JDX-TRRE].
48. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C.
Oct. 5, 2011), 2011 WL 2444825, http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/497671/download
[https://perma.cc/3SLQ-3KZ8].
49. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition of
Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission
Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporationabandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department [https://perma.cc/8378825M].
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 5 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF85JRLG].
51. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2015).
52. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, supra note 32, at 2.
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inpatient and outpatient services.
Why didn’t the government bring the vertical case against St.
Luke’s?53 In part, the FTC did not need to do so (unlike the private
plaintiffs) because the FTC had standing to bring the case as a much
more legally cautious horizontal case.54 The FTC also benefitted from
defining the market narrowly as a horizontal case.55 Nevertheless, failing
to decide the case under a vertical theory of harm (or at least plead both
vertical and horizontal theories of harm in the same complaint),
contributes to the lack of cases litigated on the merits of a vertical
theory. The advantage to a vertical theory in St. Luke’s is that we believe
a consent decree would not have been possible due to the all-or-nothing
nature of the hospital merger. Such a case would have offered much
needed clarity in case law and vertical merger policy. The most recent
Supreme Court vertical merger case is from 1972.56 The only “recent”
vertical merger decided case (from 1997) is HTI Health Services, Inc. v.
Quorum Health Group, Inc.,57 where the court did not find substantial
foreclosure. Quorum was a private case in which a hospital
unsuccessfully challenged the merger of a private hospital and two
physician groups in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The plaintiff hospital
brought both a horizontal theory of harm (physician services and
managed care purchasing markets) and a vertical theory of harm (acute
inpatient hospital services market). To be sure, there have been
numerous vertical mergers challenged since 1997 but these have resulted
in consents, settlements, or deals that were abandoned.58

53. Salop and Culley suggest that the nature of the foreclosure (either input or customer
foreclosure) was unclear. See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of
Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners 20 n.39 (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2404&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/6YKF-2HCP] (“This concern [of customer foreclosure in St. Luke’s] might be
classified instead as input foreclosure in that the payers tend to be third-party insurance companies
or managed care operators, and that the patients are inputs who are steered to one or another
hospital by the doctors. Where the merging firms produce complementary products, it is often
possible to categorize the foreclosure either as input or customer foreclosure.”).
54. On antitrust standing and foreclosure more generally, see Roger D. Blair & Christine A.
Piette, Antitrust Injury and Standing in Foreclosure Cases, 31 J. CORP. L. 401 (2006).
55. Complaint for Permanent Injunction, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 13-cv-116BLW (D. Idaho Mar. 26 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/03/
130312stlukescmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E5W-M6KY].
56. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
57. HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
58. See Salop & Culley, supra note 53, at app.
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Vertical merger analysis has broader implications because antitrust
analysis of vertical mergers corresponds to vertical analysis short of
merger. Such analysis has been under-developed in the case law. The St.
Luke’s case and the issue of vertical integration implicates more than
just vertical merger law. It also impacts vertical integration through
financial and clinical integration via ACOs. The Ninth Circuit St. Luke’s
decision also suggests that courts do not understand the benefit of
ACOs. ACOs contain both horizontal and vertical elements, yet the
Ninth Circuit recently analyzed the merger only horizontally.59 The court
also rejected any potential efficiencies in the structure,60 thereby casting
into doubt the ability to effectively implement ACOs in the future. To
provide context for ACO implications of the St. Luke’s merger, this
Section provides an overview of ACO competition issues.
Antitrust enforcement with regard to physician practices in the
modern era begins with the 1996 FTC/DOJ Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement in Health Care (the Statements).61 The Statements were
written at a time of HMO growth. As such, the Statements recognized
the possibility that integration that was short of a full merger between
hospital and physician groups as part of “clinical integration” would fall
under “rule of reason” treatment rather than “per se”62 treatment that the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society63
otherwise demanded.64 In Maricopa County, the Supreme Court found a
per se violation of physician controlled foundations for medical care that
had fixed the maximum reimbursement rates for their members.65 This
arrangement lacked any financial integration and, as such, the
relationship was viewed as a price fixing agreement and therefore per se
59. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 783–92 (9th Cir. 2015).
60. Id. at 791–92.
61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS], http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0000.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5TJ-ASTT].
62. For a background and treatment of the per se rule and rule of reason, see, for example,
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733–37 (2012).
63. 457 U.S. 322 (1982).
64. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 82–87.
65. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 355–57.
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illegal.66 The problem with Maricopa County is that the Court did not
give sufficient attention to the possibility that clinical integration, rather
than financial integration, might also create pro-competitive effects that
would overcome the potential anti-competitive effects and therefore
would deserve rule of reason treatment.67
The Statements diverged from Maricopa County based on the
potential efficiencies that such integration might have.68 However, the
meaning of “clinical integration” remained elusive.69 The agencies first
attempted to define this concept in Statements 8 and 9:
Physician network joint ventures that do not involve the sharing
of substantial financial risk may also involve sufficient
integration to demonstrate that the venture is likely to produce
significant efficiencies. Such integration can be evidenced by
the network implementing an active and ongoing program to
evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network’s
physician participants and create a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to
control costs and ensure quality. This program may include: (1)
establishing mechanisms to monitor and control utilization of
health care services that are designed to control costs and assure
quality of care; (2) selectively choosing network physicians who
are likely to further these efficiency objectives; and (3) the
significant investment of capital, both monetary and human, in
the necessary infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed
efficiencies.70
This formulation of clinical integration was quite broad, which may
have been by design.71 The Statements were not the last word in vertical
66. Id. at 357 (“[T]he fee agreements . . . are among independent competing entrepreneurs. They
fit squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.”).
67. Mark R. Patterson, Justice Stevens and Market Relationships in Antitrust, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1809, 1821 (2006); Rocco J. De Grasse, Note, Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se
Characterization in Horizontal Price Fixing Cases, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007, 1051–62 (1984).
68. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 80 (“Experience indicates that, in general, more
significant efficiencies are likely to result from a physician network joint venture’s substantial
financial risk sharing or substantial clinical integration. However, the Agencies will consider a
broad range of possible cost savings, including improved cost controls, case management and
quality assurance, economies of scale, and reduced administrative or transaction costs.”).
69. Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve Been and What
Should Be Done Now, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 847, 853–54 (2015).
70. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 72–73.
71. Robert F. Leibenluft, The ACO Antitrust Policy Statement: Antitrust Enforcement Meets
Regulatory Rulemaking, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1, 2 (“The FTC and DOJ explained that
they did not wish to offer more details regarding what might constitute clinical integration out of
concern that more prescriptive language might dampen innovation. Officials of these antitrust
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integration, however. The FTC staff started to offer advisory opinions as
to the application of the Statements.72
2.

ACO Policy Statement

The antitrust agencies have offered more recent guidance on vertical
relations short of merger. To encourage increased competition through
the ACA, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC issued a Statement of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(ACO Policy Statement).73
ACOs create the potential for great benefit in the health care system.
However, ACOs also create potential for anti-competitive harms
including higher prices and/or lower quality.74 Consequently, the
antitrust agencies set out ACO Guidelines to assist ACOs in navigating a
path that leads to increased consumer welfare. This analysis addresses
many of the issues that emerge in integration via merger between a
hospital and physician group.
a.

ACO Policy Statement Background

DOJ and FTC offered the ACO Policy Statement to provide greater
antitrust clarity regarding ACO formation. The ACO Policy Statement is
premised on ACOs’ ability to promote greater efficiencies through
higher quality of service and lower cost between hospitals (upstream)
and physician groups (downstream).75 As a matter of design, the
implementation of ACO Guidelines does not live up to its promise.
Consequently, we believe that rather than vertically integrate via
contract, firms will choose to do so via merger. Firms will do so because
firms will choose the greater certainty of vertical integration via
acquisition because the complexities of clinical integration through
ACOs outweigh the value of it.
The goal of ACOs is to provide lower-cost health care with better
agencies feared that providers might feel constrained to using arrangements that closely followed
whatever model the guidelines would describe, at the expense of developing their own approaches
better suited to meet their particular needs.”).
72. Id. at 3–4.
73. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
74. Richard M. Scheffler, Accountable Care Organizations: Integrated Care Meets Market
Power, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 639, 640–41 (2015).
75. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026 (noting that ACOs
provide opportunities for innovation in health care and corresponding benefits to consumers).
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quality.76 Implementation issues for ACOs have been difficult such that
reaching this goal has not been easy.77 Under the Affordable Care Act,
incentives have been set up under the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP) to reward improved pay to the ACOs for improved
performance.78 Under the ACA, ACOs have been tasked with
development of efficiencies in Medicare.79 Under the MSSP program,
according to Professor Greaney, ACOs “constitute an intermediary
model for reform that does not require providers to assume insurance
and technical risk for care provided to beneficiaries but still provides
financial incentives to reorient delivery arrangements.”80
b.

Antitrust Analysis of the ACO Policy Statement

The FTC and DOJ issued the ACO Policy Statement in October
2011.81 The Statement created “safety zones” for ACOs that operate as
safe harbors—situations in which the presumptive anti-competitive harm
that would run afoul of antitrust law is unlikely.82 ACO participants who
provide a “common service” and have a combined market share of thirty
percent of each common service in each participant’s Primary Service
Area fall within the safety zone.83 Clinical integration standards are set
not by the antitrust agencies but instead by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS).84
Do the pro-competitive restraints outweigh the anti-competitive
effects? The question with ACOs is whether or not there is efficiencyenhancing integration. If there is, the ACO will escape per se analysis
under Maricopa County.85 In essence, the antitrust agencies offer rule of
reason treatment if ACOs: “(1) meet the CMS eligibility requirements;
(2) participate in the MSSP; and (3) use with commercial plans the same
governance, leadership structure, and clinical and administrative
76. Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and
Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2014).
77. Id. (calling implementation “a wrenching process”).
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012)).
79. Id.
80. Greaney, supra note 76, at 6.
81. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
82. Id. at 67,028.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 67,027–28.
85. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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processes that they use under the MSSP.”86
The final ACO Policy Statement does not provide sufficient clarity on
the issue of how best to clinically integrate in a way that leads to lower
cost and better quality while complying with antitrust law.87 The most
recent ACO statement merely notes, “[c]linical integration can be
evidenced by the joint venture implementing an active and ongoing
program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the venture’s
providers and to create a high degree of interdependence and
cooperation among the providers to control costs and ensure quality.”88
Unfortunately, the ACO Guidelines also go on to say that the
determination of clinical integration will be on a case-by-case basis.89
This adds to the uncertainty of clinical integration.90 This uncertainty can
push hospitals toward a decision to integrate via merger rather than
through contractual integration, particularly in small acquisitions that
might not be detected due to being below the HSR reporting threshold91
or because the creeping acquisitions are in less concentrated markets.
Consequently, there has not been as much certainty regarding ACOs
as hospitals interested in ACO development might want. Thus far there
has only been one advisory opinion request issued by the FTC since the
introduction of the ACO Policy Statement.92 Yet, more ACOs are in
86. Leibenluft, supra note 71, at 5–6.
87. Id. at 7 (noting “[t]he ACO Antitrust Policy Statement takes a much more mechanistic, almost
regulatory, approach”).
88. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027.
89. Id.
90. Lawrence P. Casalino, The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the
Organization of Physician Networks, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 569, 579 (2006); Thomas L.
Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity, and Market Power in Provider Contracting,
14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 69 (2014).
91. See the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2012), and the related Premerger Notification Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 801–803 (2015).
92. Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Michael E.
Joseph (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/
norman-physician-hospital-organization/130213normanphoadvltr_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TRBBYME]. Note, however, that there were advisory opinions prior to the Policy Statement. See Letter
from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to John J. Miles (Feb. 19,
2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions/advisory-opinion-miles-02-19-02
[https://perma.cc/7ZEK-NALA]; Letter from David R. Pender, Acting Assistant Dir., Bureau of
Competition, FTC, to Clifton E. Johnson & William H. Thompson (Mar. 28, 2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/suburban-health-organization/
suburbanhealthorganizationstaffadvisoryopinion03282006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2KR-9YSN];
Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Christi J. Braun &
John J. Miles (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisoryopinions/greater-rochester-independent-practice-association-inc./gripa.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VQLUHV3]; Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Christi J.
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operation,93 which may suggest that those ACOs that are operating at the
margins in terms of behavior that may be anti-competitive have not
asked for advisory opinions. ACOs may also be complicated to
implement in practice, which might push providers to merge rather than
partially integrate through ACOs. Particularly due to opportunities to
benefit from arbitrage of different reimbursement rates, ACOs may be
too complex given the potential returns for providers.94
Much remains unknown as to the pro- versus anti-competitive value
of ACOs. Professor Scheffler of Berkeley explains:
At present, regulators like the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice are adapting existing metrics to
measure the impact of the market power of ACOs. Moreover,
we do not know what quality improvements to expect from
ACOs or how such improvements should be measured. Is the
ACO producing value for patients, and is it worth the cost? How
should the value equation be measured and evaluated?
Compared to what? These questions can only be addressed with
ongoing research.95
i.

Research into ACOs Is Inconclusive

Although ACOs are an important new innovation, there has been little
academic work on the topic. The limited empirical work on ACOs
suggests mixed results.96 One issue that makes the study of ACO
effectiveness difficult to measure is that what to measure is not always
clear. For example, there are some limits to the ACO rules, including
how they measure quality.97 The ability of ACOs to be effective has
Braun (Apr. 13, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/tristatehealth-partners-inc./090413tristateaoletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2XN-Y9T7].
93. We note that there had been over 700 ACOs created by the end of 2014. Deborah L. Feinstein
et al., Accountable Trust Organizations and Antitrust Enforcement: Promoting Competition and
Innovation, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 875, 884 (2015). However, the merger wave in health
care has been equally significant during this period in terms of hospital-to-hospital mergers and
hospital acquisitions of physician groups.
94. Melanie Evans, Few Medicare ACOs Earned Bonuses in 2014, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 25,
2015),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150825/NEWS/150829922
[https://perma.cc/9U7A-3MJB] (“Three out of four Medicare accountable care organizations did not
slow health spending enough to earn bonuses last year, a continuation of mixed results for an
initiative that federal officials have targeted for rapid expansion.”).
95. Scheffler, supra note 74, at 643.
96. Gail R. Wilensky, Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration—A Sobering
Reflection, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1659, 1659 (2011).
97. James M. DuPree et al., Attention to Surgeons and Surgical Care Is Largely Missing from
Early Medicare Accountable Care Organizations, 33 HEALTH AFF. 972, 973 (2014) (“Notably,
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been questioned based in the theoretical economics literature through
formal modeling. As a recent working paper by Frandsen and Rebitzer
concludes, “Our estimates suggest that even minimally sized ACOs with
modest cost reduction targets will generally not be self-financing unless
extremely large economies of scale or productivity improvements
accompany ACOs.”98 To create large economies of scale to make ACOs
workable, therefore, requires some amount of market power. Yet, it is
precisely the sort of market power that scale provides that creates the
dilemma for antitrust risk exposure.
ii.

Policy Implications

The lack of clarity in the ACO Final Policy Statement and difficulty
of implementation has important policy consequences with regard to
ACOs and antitrust mergers. We believe, based on our conversations
with numerous health care providers, that the lack of clarity has
increased the desire for health provider consolidation through the
acquisition of physician groups. Rather than risk antitrust exposure
through the implementation of ACOs (in a way that would maximize
their value), a number of hospitals have gone about vertically integrating
via merger with physician practices.99 Such hospitals have done so as a
way to address productivity and scale through merger. These hospitals
have done so with small acquisitions as a deliberate way to “fly under
the radar” of federal and state antitrust agencies because such
transactions fall under HSR reporting requirements.100 When courts,
such as the one in St. Luke’s, suggest that efficiencies could have been
effectuated under circumstances less than a merger, consolidation via
none of CMS’ thirty-three ACO quality measures directly addresses surgery or surgical care.”).
98. Bringham Frandsen & James B. Rebitzer, Structuring Incentives Within Organizations: The
Case of Accountable Care Organizations 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20034, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20034 [https://perma.cc/9LVS-LBG6].
99. U.S. Health Services Total Deal Value for Q1 2014 Rose 152%, Pointing to Renewed Deals
Confidence Post-ACA Implementation, According to PwC US, PR NEWSWIRE (May 20, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-health-services-total-deal-value-for-q1-2014-rose152-pointing-to-renewed-deals-confidence-post-aca-implementation-according-to-pwc-us259926451.html [https://perma.cc/GL8Q-H8ZM] (“The current trend of physician practice
acquisitions by physician practice management companies is expected to continue in the near term
as specialty-based physician groups look for ways to respond to reimbursement changes and higher
regulatory costs of maintaining their practices.”).
100. See supra note 91 for the HSR rules. On the impact of hospital acquisitions of physicians,
see Scott Baltic, Monopolizing Medicine: Why Hospital Consolidation May Increase Healthcare
Costs, MED. ECON. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medicaleconomics/content/tags/hospital-employment/monopolizing-medicine-why-hospital-consolidation?page=full [https://perma.cc/5WFQ-TXTM].
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merger suggests that hospitals believe such consolidation faces fewer
transaction costs than ACOs and that perhaps ACOs are less effective
than their original promise may have suggested.
C.

Recent Enforcement Trends

Overall, the lack of clarity as to the meaning of ACOs does not mean
that the antitrust agencies have been silent as to behavior that is
unambiguously anti-competitive. Certain behavior that is per se illegal
remains clear because there is no integration, whether clinical or
financial. This includes DOJ enforcement against an association of
chiropractors in South Dakota that had an eighty percent market share in
the state.101 The chiropractors in the association did not have any
financial or clinical integration but were able to raise their
reimbursements from insurers through joint negotiation. As part of the
settlement with DOJ, the association was prohibited from price setting
and joint negotiation for its members.102 The FTC also has been active in
enforcement of per se violations. This includes a recent case against
nephrologists in Puerto Rico that lacked any financial or clinical
integration but participated in a group boycott against insurers that did
not agree with the nephrologists’ demands for an increase in
reimbursement rates.103
D.

Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Health Care Integration

ACOs and vertical mergers also implicate a larger question of how
transaction cost economics works in the health care setting.104
Transaction cost economics suggests that there is a “make or buy”
decision for firms—firms can integrate via ownership or via contract.105
Organizational complexity may dictate whether or not there are
economies of scale or diseconomies of scale to create greater benefit to
ownership rather than contract.106 These issues emerge in health care
101. Complaint at 1, United States v. Chiropractic Assocs. of S.D., No. 4:13-cv-04030, 2013 WL
5595936 (D.S.D. Sept. 3, 2013), 2013 WL 1727875.
102. Id. at *2.
103. P.R. Nephrologists, 155 F.T.C. 874 (2013), 2013 WL 8364917.
104. Renee A. Stiles et al., The Logic of Transaction Cost Economics in Health Care
Organization Theory, 26 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 85 (2001).
105. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) [hereinafter
Coase, Nature of the Firm]; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3
(1988).
106. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
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consolidation and impact whether or not a hospital will choose to merge
with a physician group or merely contract via an ACO.107
The St. Luke’s case did not address potential transaction costs
between the hospital and the physicians group. A more robust economic
analysis of the proposed merger would have examined scale and scope
efficiencies of the acquisition in terms of the transaction costs and would
have analyzed whether or not an ACO would have been a possible
alternative to a full merger. The analysis also would have suggested
what the limits of ACOs may be.
1.

Basics of Transaction Cost Economics

Organizational structure impacts the costs associated with physician
groups.108 Structure impacts size and scope of practice. Consequently,
the impact of financial incentives changes in importance based on the
size of the group practice.109
We first begin with some basic economic description within a
transaction cost economics (TCE) framework. Hospitals produce acute
care hospital services. To do so, they need physician services. It is easy
to appreciate the need for the traditional hospital-based physicians—
anesthesiologists, emergency room physicians, pathologists, and
radiologists. But hospitals also need admitting and attending physicians.
By the same token, physicians need a place to send patients who cannot
be treated without the sophisticated medical equipment and specialized
care that only hospitals can provide.110
The relationship between hospitals and physician groups can be
organized through contracts or through formal integration.111 In some
cases, a group of physicians may construct their own hospital.112 These
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 103–30 (1985) (explaining how organization complexity and size can
lead to inefficiencies); Todd R. Zenger, Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D:
Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size, 40
MGMT. SCI. 708, 708–09 (1994) (showing how smaller firms are better to address agency cost
problems).
107. Frech et al., supra note 34.
108. Roger Feldman, The Economics of Provider Payment Reform: Are Accountable Care
Organizations the Answer?, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 745, 746 (2015).
109. Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships, 26
RAND J. ECON. 591 (1995).
110. See generally SHERMAN FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
(David Alexander et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013).
111. Lawton Robert Burns et al., Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of
Two Tails, 15 ADVANCES HEALTH CARE MGMT. 39, 40 (2013).
112. PAUL FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 304–05 (Dave Garza et al. eds., 7th ed. 2011).
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are usually relatively small, specialized hospitals, e.g., a women’s
hospital specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. More common,
however, is the acquisition of multi-specialty physician groups by
general acute care hospitals. In either case, the integration of hospitals
and physician groups may be motivated by efficiency considerations.113
Hospitals may desire to acquire physician groups in order to reduce
transaction costs. Transaction costs are any expenditures of resources
associated with the use of the market mechanism in transferring a good
or service from one party to another. Coase (a Nobel Prize winner)114
described three categories of costs that are associated with the use of the
price system.115
a.

Search Costs

Contracts create various costs. First, there are search costs that must
be borne in order to discover the relevant prices, identities,
compatibility, and willingness to join forces.116 Hospitals must identify
physician groups that best align with their needs, and physician groups
must desire what the hospital offers. In other words, the hospital and
physician groups must match. The hospital and physician groups want to
find a way to maximize the surplus available in the market. The
challenge is to figure out how to share the combined surplus, which may
be quite contentious.
b.

Negotiation

Second, use of the market mechanism often necessitates the
negotiation (and, later, enforcement) of contracts that stipulate precisely
what the hospital and physician group agree to do.117 These contracts
113. Thomas T.H. Wan et al., Integration and the Performance of Healthcare Networks: Do
Integration Strategies Enhance Efficiency, Profitability, and Image?, INT’L J. INTEGRATED CARE,
June 1, 2001, at 1.
114. Ronald H. Coase – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-facts.html [https://perma.cc/G4P3-ZDMT] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2016).
115. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 105. In this classic paper, Coase explains that this
replacement of a market exchange with an internal (within the firm) transfer is the defining
characteristic of a firm. Without that replacement, firms, as we know them, would not exist. A later,
more extensive treatment of this same topic is provided in WILLIAMSON, supra note 105. A
thorough survey of this literature is provided by Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost
Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135 (R. Smalensee & R.D. Willig,
eds., 1989).
116. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 105, at 390.
117. Frech et al., supra note 34 (discussing transaction costs in the health care setting).
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usually specify not only the price and quantity of the health care service,
but also such details as coverage, scheduling, office space, clerical and
administrative costs, and the like. Such detailed specification of the
items affecting the purchase and sale is required to ensure that both
parties will live up to the terms of the agreement, because performance
incentives may change drastically after the initial contract is signed. 118
Generally, the longer the term of such contracts, the greater the costs of
negotiation and enforcement. The added costs result because specifying
future contingencies becomes increasingly problematic as the time
horizon is extended.119 Moreover, the more complex the transactions
become, the more difficult it is to specify all future contingencies and
the parties’ contractual obligations, should those contingencies arise.120
And any contingencies that are not covered by the terms of the contract
leave one or both firms vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the other
party.121
c.

Reduced Flexibility

Finally, in addition to negotiation and enforcement costs, there are
costs of reduced flexibility associated with market transactions that
make use of long-term contracts.122 If the market price of the input falls
during the term of the contract, the hospital will bear an opportunity cost
in being unable to take advantage of the lower price because of its
obligation to purchase the input at the higher price specified in the

118. On opportunism more generally, see Christina Ahmadjian & Joanne Oxley, Using Hostages
to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Partial Equity Stakes in Japanese Automotive
Supply Relationships, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 215 (2006) (applying Williamson’s hostageexchange model).
119. See generally Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 336–38 (1995).
120. Id. On incomplete contracts, see OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE 1–2, 72–82 (1995), and Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of
Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289, 289 (2006).
121. Scott E. Masten, About Oliver E. Williamson, in FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HIERARCHIES: THE
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 37, 41 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds.,
1999) (“As transactions become more complex and the environment more uncertain, the limitations
of contracting as a safeguard against opportunism grow, increasing the attraction of other
institutional arrangements that better support adaptive, sequential decision making while
circumscribing or redirecting opportunistic tendencies.”); see also Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity
and Vertical Integration, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and
Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 102–03 (2002).
122. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term
Contracts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 69 (1991).
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contract.123 A similar opportunity cost will be borne by the physician
group of the input if the market price increases unexpectedly during the
term of the contract.124 Changes in market conditions involving aspects
other than price (for example, the introduction of new medical
equipment, new medical devices, changes in Medicare rules, changes in
Medicare programs, new information technology systems) can impose
analogous costs on either party.125 The basic point here is that, by
entering into the contractual agreement, each party locks itself into a
predetermined pattern of behavior in order to assure the other party that
it has not misrepresented its future intentions. An unexpected alteration
of market conditions often makes this behavior suboptimal and,
therefore, costly ex post.
2.

Health Care and Transaction Cost Economics

Transaction costs implicate vertical relations within the hospital and
physician setting. By replacing the system of market exchanges with
internal transfers, integration may substantially reduce these transaction
costs.126 Instead of having hospitals and physician groups negotiate the
sale of a health care service, we have managers organize the production
and transfer of the health care service between the upstream division and
the downstream division of the integrated firm.127 As Williamson
(another Nobel Prize winner)128 has persuasively argued, replacing
market transactions with administrative decisions can often be expected
to reduce transaction costs for two fundamental reasons: (a) reducing
health care costs via integration and (b) better aligning incentives.129

123. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, Strategic Integration of Hospitals and Physicians,
25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 5–6 (2006).
124. Id.
125. Jeffrey Clemens et al., The Anatomy of Physician Payments: Contracting Subject to
Complexity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21642, 2015).
126. Frech et al., supra note 34, at 170, 172.
127. Id. at 168–69.
128. Oliver E. Williamson – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/2009/williamson-facts.html [https://perma.cc/9LDK-CNHM] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2016).
129. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442–47 (1974) [hereinafter Williamson, Economics of Antitrust]; Oliver
E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consideration, 61 AM.
ECON REV. 112, 113–14 (1971).
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Reducing Health Care Costs via Integration

Internalizing the transfer through integration alters the relationship
between the affected parties (hospital and physician group) from one of
being largely adversaries to one of being partners. Without integration,
one party often stands to gain profits at the expense of the other party.
Both parties have an incentive to increase their own profits without
regard to the impact on the other party, which may reduce their
combined profits. Williamson refers to this sort of behavior as
opportunistic.130
By joining together the profits of the two parties, vertical integration
brings about a convergence of goals and thereby eliminates (or greatly
reduces) the incentive for this sort of counter-productive behavior.131
Such convergence, in turn, reduces the costs of completing the given
transaction because the parties involved will no longer find it necessary
to expend resources designing and negotiating contracts to protect
themselves from the anticipated opportunism of the other party.
b.

Better Aligning Incentives

Vertical integration is expected to reduce transaction costs because
the incentive and control options available to the hospital are much more
extensive for intrafirm as opposed to interfirm transfers.132 It is far easier
for the manager of a hospital to discover and, as necessary, reward or
penalize the behavior of employees than it is to exercise similar controls
over the behavior of another firm. In the former case, access to the
relevant data (for example, through internal audits) is improved, and
rewards or penalties (for example, through promotions, raises, and
firings) are more easily administered. In the latter case, discovery of
opportunistic behavior is relatively costly, and haggling or litigation may
be the only means available for encouraging more desirable
performance. And failure to elicit such performance can lead to a
termination of the contractual relationship, which, in turn, requires
search for a new supplier and negotiation of a new contract, all of which
entails additional costs.
Thus, by combining the profit streams of the hospital and physician
130. See, e.g., Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 129, at 1444–45. Vertical
integration, however, does not remove principal-agent problems, which can lead to a reduction in
the total surplus available.
131. See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 123 (explaining the theory behind such integration
although not finding it empirically in their study).
132. Frech et al., supra note 34, at 168–70.
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group, integration increases the amount of information available to the
parties to the transaction and sharpens the incentives of all parties to
behave in a manner that promotes the profitability of the overall
operation.
A particular situation expected to give rise to substantial transaction
costs is that involving “transaction-specific assets.”133 Such assets arise
from investments that are undertaken to support some particular set of
market transactions.134 For example, a hospital may invest in an MRI,
proton knife, DaVinci equipment, or other complex medical equipment.
Physicians may, however, want a greater share in the profits generated
through use of this equipment and associated services, or they may
decline to use them.
The problem with transaction-specific investments is that, once these
assets are put in place (i.e., the costs are sunk), the party that owns them
becomes vulnerable to what has been termed the “hold-up problem.”135
Specifically, the physician group will recognize that the hospital’s
trading options become severely limited ex post and, consequently, may
attempt to capture a portion of the returns for itself when the contract
comes up for renewal. Or, in the extreme, the physician group may
simply renege on the contract and insist upon negotiation. The potential
for such opportunistic behavior may prevent the hospital from
undertaking these sorts of investments, despite their potentially
profitable and socially beneficial use.
An obvious solution to this situation is vertical integration. If both
parties to the transactions for which the assets are specifically designed
are owned by the same entity, incentives for hold-up are substantially
reduced if not eliminated entirely. Thus, vertical integration may be
motivated by the desire to avoid hold-up problems stemming from
transaction-specific investments.136

133. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
134. See Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 129.
135. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 106, at 47 (describing the hold-up problem’s opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile”).
136. A number of empirical papers have confirmed the importance of transaction-specific assets
in firms’ decisions to vertically integrate. See, e.g., Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier
Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982);
Pablo Spiller, On Vertical Mergers, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 285 (1985); Avi Weiss, The Role of FirmSpecific Capital in Vertical Mergers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1992); Avi Weiss, Vertical Mergers and
Firm-Specific Physical Capital: Three Case Studies and Some Evidence on Timing, 42 J. INDUS.
ECON. 395 (1994).
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Economies of Scale and Scope

TCE provides a theory for integration. This theory helps to explain
the push for vertical integration between hospitals and physician groups.
There are two elements that drive the incentive for integration—scale137
and scope138 economies.
Scale economies are possible when the fixed cost of production can
be spread over more units, which means that the average cost of
production of each unit declines. In health care, these economies of scale
may be a function of sharing the cost of specialized equipment over a
larger group of patients or the negotiation of better reimbursement rates
by hospitals that have scale with insurance providers.139 Diseconomies
of scale (where a larger size leads to suboptimal results) occur when
organizational complexity leads to coordination and management
inefficiencies that lead to the average cost increasing rather than
decreasing. In the health care setting, this may occur because of multispecialty groups that are multisite or are less efficient with regard to time
and resources.140 Some studies suggest that scale economies in health
care support increased consolidation.141 However, scale economies may
not always be possible in health care because of complexities in the
delivery of health care in multifaceted organizational structures. Both
theoretical and empirical work suggests that diseconomies of scale are
possible in health care.142
137. Aubrey Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice, 82 ECON. J. 369, 369 (1972)
(“Classic economies of scale relate to the effect on average costs of production of different rates of
output, per unit of time, of a given commodity, when all possible adaptations have been carried out
to make production at each scale as efficient as possible.”).
138. David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 223 (1980).
139. Colin Preyra & George Pink, Scale and Scope Efficiencies Through Hospital
Consolidations, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1049 (2006).
140. Thomas P. Weil, Multispecialty Physician Practices: Fixed and Variable Costs, and
Economies of Scale, 25 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 70, 75–76 (2002).
141. Stephen M. Shortell & Kathleen E. Hull, The New Organization of the Health Care Delivery
System, in 2 STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 101, 101 (Stuart E.
Altman & Uwe E. Reinhardt eds., 1996) (“Early evidence suggests that organized delivery systems
that are more integrated have the potential to provide more accessible coordinated care across the
continuum . . . than less integrated delivery forms.”); Lief I. Solberg et al., Is Integration in Large
Medical Groups Associated with Quality?, 15 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e34, e40 (2009) (“This
demonstration of a relationship between integration and quality provides support for encouragement
of integration.”).
142. Gregory C. Pope & Russel T. Burge, Inefficiencies in Physician Practices, in ADVANCES IN
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 129 (Richard M. Scheffler & Louis F.
Rossiter eds., 1992); Burns et al., supra note 111, at 56–57; Lawton R. Burns et al., The Financial
Performance of Integrated Health Organizations, J. HEALTHCARE MGMT., May/June 2005, at 191,
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Scope economies allow for a decline in the average cost of production
because of integration of shared resources.143 Units of production
increase while costs decrease. In the health care setting, this may include
such things as electronic medical records or a single management
structure. Scope inefficiencies may include situations when the multipractice groups within a single practice do not work efficiently.144
d.

Managerial Diseconomies

As more and more physician groups are brought within the hospital’s
control, efficient management of the total operation becomes
increasingly difficult. We refer to this problem as “managerial
diseconomies.”145 Eventually, the additional costs of trying to coordinate
one more stage of production will exceed the transaction cost savings
that result from internalizing this additional stage.
Because transaction costs are associated with all real-world markets,
the economic incentive to integrate may well be pervasive to address
real market concerns and to create efficiencies. Yet, as we pointed out
earlier, all firms, including hospitals, do continue to use some
intermediate services markets. No hospital owns all of the physician
inputs that it uses in the production of its health care services.146 The
reason for this lack of complete integration is that vertical integration
itself tends to increase the firm’s costs. Expanding the hospital’s
operations through additional physician group acquisition increases the
problems of coordinating all the hospital’s activities. At that point, the
hospital will refrain from further vertical integration and will make use
191 (“Results from a study of 36 large integrated health organizations (IHOs) suggest that financial
performance is adversely affected by the scale of investment in integration . . . .”); José J. Escarce &
Mark V. Pauly, Physician Opportunity Costs in Physician Practice Cost Functions, 17 J. HEALTH
ECON. 129 (1998) (theorizing on economies and diseconomies of scale); Jeff Goldsmith, Integrating
Care: A Talk with Kaiser Permanente’s David Lawrence, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2002, at 39, 39
(“Hospitals ended up not dealing with some of the basic things that have to happen for an integrated
system to work right”); Weil, supra note 140 (finding that multispecialty practices with fifty-one or
more doctors are less efficient).
143. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production, 91 Q.J.
ECON. 481 (1977).
144. R. Rosenman & D. Friesner, Scope and Scale Inefficiencies in Physician Practices, 13
HEALTH ECON. 1091 (2004) (finding that multi-specialty groups are less efficient than single
specialty groups); Sisira Sarma et al., Physician’s Production of Primary Care in Ontario, Canada,
19 HEALTH ECON. 14, 27 (2010) (finding scale economies in Canada).
145. For another application, see Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, The Impact of Complexity
and Managerial Diseconomies on Hierarchical Governance, 84 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 586
(2012).
146. See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 123, at 6–10.
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of the intermediate services market for the allocation of this input.
Thus, while transaction costs provide a major incentive to vertically
integrate, managerial diseconomies place a limit on the extent to which
such integration will occur.147 Consequently, the extent of vertical
integration (the number of production stages brought within the
hospital’s control) is determined where the incremental cost of
internalization equals or exceeds the incremental cost of market
exchange. By expanding the firm’s breadth of operations to this point,
the overall costs of producing and delivering the final product to the
consumer are minimized. The optimal mix of internal and market
exchange is selected, and the expanse of the hospital’s activities is
determined.
Where vertical integration—via either internal expansion or merger—
occurs in response to the presence of transaction costs, total welfare is
improved by such integration.148 Cost reductions that do not themselves
lead to any increase in market power will result in price reductions for
final product consumers.149 Both producers and consumers can be made
better off—profits can increase even as final output price falls by
avoiding the costs of using the market mechanism. Consequently,
antitrust policy should do nothing to discourage vertical integration
under these circumstances.150
Overall, the literature on transaction cost economics explains the
motivations for integration via contract and merger. TCE has profound
implications on antitrust merger policy151 and in particular on analysis of
health care mergers between hospitals and physician groups. The lack of
rigorous analysis of this in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to provide

147. Id.
148. Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic
Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1314–16 (2013).
149. On the limits of vertical integration in such circumstances, see Janusz A. Ordover et al.,
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan,
Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1232 (1998).
150. Indeed, many of the problems regarding health care competition are a function of bad
regulatory design rather than private restraints of trade. See generally David L. Meyer & Charles F.
(Rick) Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 169, 179 (1994) (“In health care, moreover, apparent imperfections in the
functioning of market competition largely can be attributed to distortions caused by government
intervention and the historical bias against competition in the field.”). Specific to health care
mergers involving physician group acquisitions, a physician will receive higher reimbursement rates
for outpatient care that is delivered by an “integrated” system. See Burns et al., supra note 111, at
68; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 24, at 1072.
151. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Bryan Keating, Antitrust, Transaction Costs, and Merger
Simulation with Nonlinear Pricing, 58 J.L. & ECON. 268 (2015).
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sophisticated analysis and clarity for future mergers and integration short
of mergers.
II.

FORECLOSURE

A.

Foreclosure Claim

Physicians in an integrated hospital may refer patients to their own
hospital152 through foreclosure.153 When a hospital acquires a large
multi-specialty physician practice, the impact on rival hospitals in the
local market can be substantial.154 Since the physicians of the acquired
practices now are employed by the hospital, they will presumably refer
all of their patients to their new hospital. In other words, the acquisition
forecloses the rival hospital from these patients. In order to compete, the
rival hospitals would have to be sufficiently more attractive to induce the
patients to switch physicians. This, of course, may be possible for some
patients but certainly not for all of them. The court in St. Luke’s did not
properly understand the argument regarding foreclosure. A better
understanding of this argument would have led to improved case law
analysis not merely for this case but for its precedential value.
B.

Economic Rationale

As one might expect, the acquisition generates mutual benefits for the
hospital and the practice group. Physicians are largely responsible for
selecting the hospital for their patients. Each referral confers a benefit on
the hospital that can be measured by the increased contribution margin.
152. Ann S. O’Malley et al., Rising Hospital Employment of Physicians: Better Quality, Higher
Costs?, ISSUE BRIEF (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Wash. D.C.), Aug. 2011,
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1230 [https://perma.cc/2QV4-FVDA] (providing theoretical
concern); Laurence C. Baker et al., The Effect of Hospital/Physician Integration on Hospital Choice
17
(Nat’l
Bureau
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
21497,
2015),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21497 [https://perma.cc/22M6-4AHA] (“We find that a hospital’s
ownership of an admitting physician dramatically increases the probability that the physician’s
patients will choose the owning hospital. We also find that ownership of an admitting physician has
large effects on how the hospital’s cost and quality affect patients’ hospital choice. Patients whose
admitting physician is not owned by a hospital are more likely to choose facilities that are low cost
and high quality. . . . By contrast, patients are more likely to choose a high-cost, low-quality hospital
when their admitting physician’s practice is owned by that hospital.”).
153. Ordover et al., supra note 149; Richard S. Higgins, Competitive Vertical Foreclosure, 20
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 229 (1999).
154. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, Address at the Fifth National
Accountable Care Organization Summit: Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not
Prescription 8 (June 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
409481/140619_aco_speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7YA-FZL4].
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By acquiring a physician’s practice group, the hospital is essentially
buying those referrals. The physicians also benefit because the price that
is negotiated includes the capitalized value of the incremental
contribution margin.155 There is no way for a hospital to pay for referrals
due to anti-kickback rules.156 If a practice group is acquired, however,
the hospital can “pay” the physicians by including a premium in the
acquisition price.157
The private plaintiffs in St. Luke’s offered a vertical foreclosure
theory that involved referrals from the Saltzer group physicians drying
up (relative to pre-merger) for their own inpatient admissions postmerger.158 This meant that the channel for distribution of inpatient
admissions would be foreclosed. The district court noted that prior
practice at St. Luke’s suggested a history of foreclosure.159 The court
explained, based on the testimony of Professor Haas-Wilson, that
“[a]fter St. Luke’s purchased five specialty practices, ‘their business at
Saint Alphonsus Boise dropped dramatically[, and] the amount of
business that they did at St. Luke’s facilities increased dramatically.’” 160
The court suggested that such a practice was likely to be replicated.161
On appeal, there was no discussion of this issue, even though the
implications of such foreclosure permeated the facts and needed to be
addressed.
The economic reality is that in a world of price caps for certain
hospital services, firms will attempt to increase the bottom line by
increasing the total provision of hospital services. Given anti-steering
155. The contribution margin is the difference between the incremental revenue and the
incremental cost. It is a measure of the incremental profit resulting from the added referrals.
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Honest Services, and
Health Care Fraud After Skilling, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 137 (2012).
157. This same phenomenon occurs in hospital acquisitions of other hospitals. See Regina E.
Herzlinger et al., Market-Based Solutions to Antitrust Threats — The Rejection of the Partners
Settlement, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1287 (2015).
158. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, supra note 32.
159. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *13 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775
(9th Cir. 2015).
160. Id.
161. Id. A related theory would be a raising rival’s cost theory regarding the vertical effects of the
merger that would not cause exit from the market but merely raise costs for rivals. See Steven C.
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). Using the
regulatory system as such a strategy, as through higher reimbursement rates, makes it more difficult
for other physician groups to compete because of the lack of referrals sent to them. See Steven C.
Salop et al., A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals’ Costs in a Rent
Seeking Society, in FTC LAW & ECON. CONFERENCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 102 (1984).
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rules, the best way to increase the total provision of services is through
“buying” referrals.162 As long as the hospital has some unfilled beds, it
can increase its total profits by filling them. One way to do this is by
using referrals. The difference between the hospital’s charges and the
marginal cost of an additional patient will flow to the bottom line as
additional profit. This business strategy has the consequence of
foreclosing competition by favoring in-network providers over out-ofnetwork providers.
III.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE HORIZONTAL CASE

In a horizontal merger case, the antitrust concern rests with the
following two issues: “A merger can enhance market power simply by
eliminating competition between the merging parties . . . . A merger also
can enhance market power by increasing the risk of coordinated,
accommodating, or interdependent behavior among rivals.”163 In St.
Luke’s, the horizontal case focused on a number of the traditional
competitive effects elements, as embodied in the 2010 Merger
Guidelines.164 We address those issues below, positing that a more
sophisticated analysis by the courts would have led to better guidance in
line with economic theory. The horizontal case would have been
stronger had St. Luke’s properly understood the quality-based arguments
and how quality and cost work within the same merger.
A.

Countervailing Power in Health Care

From the horizontal perspective (as well as from a vertical one),
physician acquisitions implicate negotiating power between providers
and insurers. It is precisely to obtain the benefits of increased negotiating
leverage that motivates many hospitals (and physician groups) to merge
to obtain countervailing power over insurance providers and improve
hospital bargaining position vis-à-vis insurers.165 This Section lays out

162. One might also attempt a related strategy. Because of the politics of pricing certain specialty
services too high, hospitals might engage in spreading out the cost in what is the competitive
(commoditized) services thereby raising the prices of these services because of the anti-competitive
cross subsidization.
163. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 1.
164. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 783–92 (9th Cir. 2015).
165. Peter P. Budetti et al., Physician and Health System Integration, 21 HEALTH AFF. 203
(2002); Michael A. Morrisey et al., Managed Care and Physician/Hospital Integration, 15 HEALTH
AFF. 62 (1996); Douglas A. Staiger et al., Trends in the Work Hours of Physicians in the United
States, 303 JAMA 747 (2010).
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the arguments associated with such countervailing power.166 Indeed,
such an argument was a basis to justify the St. Luke’s merger.167 Adult
primary care physician reimbursement rates with insurers received
treatment in two short paragraphs on appeal.168
In some geographic markets, dominant health insurers appear to have
some measure of monopsony power (enhanced market power of buyers)
in dealing with fragmented health care providers.169 The exercise of
monopsony power by health insurers increases their profits at the
expense of the health care providers.170 If the unorganized health care
providers (physicians or nurses) or hospitals can consolidate their
operations, they can create countervailing power, i.e., power on the other
side of the market. In doing so, the market structure becomes one with
elements of bilateral monopoly.171 Interestingly, the creation of
countervailing monopoly power in the face of a lawful monopsony
reduces the allocative inefficiency resulting from the exercise of
monopsony power. This may seem counterintuitive, but it is correct
nonetheless. These results can be illustrated with a simple economic
model.
1.

The Economics of Countervailing Power
The basic economic model of countervailing power is illustrated in

166. See generally David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers’ Strategies, Entry Barriers
and Competition, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992).
167. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775
(9th Cir. 2015) (“The leverage gained by the Acquisition would give St. Luke’s the ability to make
these higher rates ‘stick’ in future contract negotiations.”).
168. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786–87.
169. For a compact treatment of the economics of monopsony, see Roger D. Blair & Christina
DePasquale, Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 364; Roger D. Blair &
Christine Piette Durrance, Group Purchasing Organizations, Monopsony, and Antitrust Policy, 35
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 433 (2014).
170. For an examination involving physicians, see Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician
Collective Bargaining: State Legislation, and the State Action Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731
(2005); Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: An
Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2004).
171. The economics of bilateral monopoly can be traced to A.L. Bowley, Bilateral Monopoly, 38
ECON. J. 651 (1928). See also Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and
the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 492–96 (2012); Richard
Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 873; Fritz Machlup &
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA
101 (1960). In the health context, see Blair & Coffin, supra note 170, and Blair & Herndon, supra
note 170.
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Figure 1. The demand for health services is captured by the negatively
sloped line D while the supply is represented by S. If the market were
competitive, Q1 units of health services would be purchased at P1 per
unit. This competitive solution maximizes social or total welfare, which
is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. If a dominant health
insurer purchases the health services, profit maximization will lead to a
restriction in the quantity purchased. For the monopsonist, profit
maximization requires purchasing the quantity where the marginal
expenditure on health care services (ME) equals demand.172 This means
that the quantity purchased will fall to Q2 and price will fall to P2. The
exercise of monopsony power converts some producer surplus into
consumer (or buyer) surplus. From a social welfare perspective, this is
just a transfer from producers of health care services to the health
insurers. When quantity falls from Q1 to Q2, we can see that the value of
health care services between Q1 and Q2, as measured by the height of
demand, exceed their cost as measured by the height of supply. Thus,
there is an allocative inefficiency (area deb) associated with
monopsony—even a lawful one.

Figure 1
172. One can understand this via a technical proof. We provide a description instead in the text.
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The loss of producer surplus provides a powerful incentive for health
care providers to consolidate. In doing so, they become a monopolist.
The market structure becomes one of bilateral monopoly: a monopolist
supplier confronting a monopsonist buyer. A change in the market
structure from monopsony to bilateral monopoly is procompetitive. The
output will increase from the noncompetitive level (Q2) to the
competitive level (Q1), i.e., bargaining will lead to the surplusmaximizing output. This eliminates the allocative inefficiency and the
corresponding deadweight total welfare loss.
In a bilateral monopoly, the two parties have an incentive to agree on
the surplus-maximizing quantity and then bargain over the price. In this
context, the price is not a rationing device; after all, the quantity has
already been agreed upon. Instead, the price is simply a mechanism for
sharing the jointly maximized surplus. Consequently, the price is
indeterminate. We can bound the price range by considering the all-ornone demand (DA) and the all-or-none supply (SA).
At quantity Q1, the height of the all-or-none demand is the maximum
price (P3) the monopolist can command. At that price, all of consumer
surplus has been extracted. Analogously, at Q1, the height of the all-ornone supply is the lowest price since that price (P4) allows the
monopsonist to extract the entire producer surplus. These maximum and
minimum prices set the bargaining range. The competitive price is in
that range, but there is nothing that particularly recommends that price as
a solution.173
Although the actual price is indeterminate, there are some likely price
effects. If competing sellers merge in response to monopsony, the price
is apt to rise above P2—because the firms merged in pursuit of a better
deal. These price movements, however, have no competitive
significance since quantity does not respond to such price changes. The
price movement does have distributive consequences, but these have no
impact on total welfare.
The Ninth Circuit examined two related issues involving the
possibility of bilateral monopoly in St. Luke’s.174 The first involved adult
primary care physician provider reimbursements. Though noting that the
district court had found that the “acquisition limited the ability of
insurers to negotiate with the merged entity,” the Ninth Circuit merely
173. In this specific example, the competitive price divides the surplus evenly, which is consistent
with the Nash bargaining solution.
174. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 786–87 (9th Cir. 2015).
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summarized that the lower court did not find that any price decreases
would be passed onto consumers.175
B.

Role of Efficiencies

Horizontal merger studies of hospitals show that efficiency gains are
possible.176 For example, Dranove and Lindrooth find efficiencies in cost
decreases of fourteen percent for standalone hospitals integrated into
hospital systems.177 Other mergers may lack efficiencies and may serve
to raise prices.178
Post-ACA there has been a trend toward vertical integration of
physician groups into hospitals. According to Kocher and Sahni, more
than half of all physicians are now employed by hospitals.179 The
combination of a hospital and one or more physician groups is
sometimes referred to as an integrated delivery system (IDS). Such IDSs
should theoretically lower costs because they can more easily coordinate
care, improve communication among providers, reduce unnecessary
duplication of tests and procedures, and generate other efficiencies.180
When a hospital first acquires a physician group, the acquisition is
vertical in nature. The hospital is acquiring inputs it requires in the
production of health care services. The ideas about reduced transactions
costs and other efficiencies achieved through vertical integration
described earlier apply to this case. Once the hospital is already
established as an IDS, then subsequent acquisitions of physician groups
continue to be vertical in nature. However, they also now have elements
of horizontal integration as the IDS, which is already comprised of
physician groups, continues to acquire additional physician groups.
The effects of vertical versus horizontal integration may be different.
175. Id.
176. David Dranove & Richard Lindrooth, Hospital Consolidation and Costs: Another Look at
the Evidence, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 983 (2003). But see Teresa D. Harrison, Do Mergers Really
Reduce Costs? Evidence from Hospitals, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 1054 (2011) (finding that costs
declined but then rose to pre-merger levels).
177. Dranove & Lindrooth, supra note 176, at 983 (“Mergers in which hospitals consolidate
financial reporting and licenses generate savings of approximately 14%: 2, 3, and 4 years after
merger.”).
178. Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the
Hospital Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 172, 174, 195 (2015) (finding a 30.5% price increase in the
FTC challenge against the Inova merger).
179. Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians – The Logic
Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, NEW ENG. J. MED., May 12, 2011, at 1790, 1790.
180. Wenke Hwang et al., Effects of Integrated Delivery System on Cost and Quality, 19 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE e175 (2013).
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First, prices may be reduced through transactions cost savings generated
through vertical integration. Second, prices may increase through the
impact of tied purchasing through vertical integration. In other words,
prices could be affected through the bundling of physician and hospital
services. Finally, prices could be positively affected if the horizontal
integration that occurs reduces the number of competitors and/or creates
market power.
The potential for efficiencies exists in both the horizontal integration
of physician groups as well as in the vertical integration of physician
groups with hospitals. Rationales for integration among physicians into
physician groups include:
[C]reating modern practice infrastructure such as information
technology (IT) and revenue cycle enhancement, enhancing
operating efficiency, creating negotiating leverage, relieving
physicians of administrative duties, income preservation,
improving quality, increasing scale to manage risk contracts,
improving the ability to coordinate care and referrals,
positioning to serve as an ACO under health reform, fostering
physician leadership, supporting population health, and
improved ability to manage an uncertain and turbulent
environment.181
Physician and physician groups may also face incentives to integrate
with hospitals. These rationales include:
[P]reparing for global risk contracting or capitation (e.g., by
incorporating PCPs into hospital networks), increasing network
size and geographic coverage to handle risk contracting, taking
responsibility for the health status of the local population,
offering a seamless continuum of care, responding to federal and
state health reform legislation, and protecting and expanding the
supply of physicians.182
These are not the only rationales. Additionally:
During the 2000s, some additional rationales were added:
mitigating competition between hospitals and their medical
staffs, sharing the cost of clinical IT with physicians, helping
physicians stabilize their incomes and supporting malpractice
expenses, increasing the predictability of the physician’s
caseload with a desire to improve care, developing regional
service lines, creating entry barriers to key clinical services,

181. Burns et al., supra note 111, at 56.
182. Id. at 67.
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helping hospitals deal with physician shortages and recruitment
needs, developing a branding and differentiation strategy,
enhancing clinical quality, leveraging payers, and preparing for
ACOs . . . .183
These rationales for integration suggest that there are some procompetitive reasons for potential merger efficiencies that courts should
weigh as part of their analysis.
Some literature has tested these hypotheses directly. Baker, Bundorf,
and Kessler investigated the effects of vertical integration in health care
on hospital pricing power.184 Using hospital claims data for non-elderly,
privately-insured patients, the authors constructed county-level indices
of hospital prices (as well as volumes of hospital admissions and
spending) and tested the effects of vertical integration on these
outcomes.185 The results suggested that fully vertically integrated
hospitals were associated with higher hospital prices, which the authors
interpreted as confirming the hypothesis that vertical integration led to
increased hospital market power.186
In a recent working paper, Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler analyze the
relationship between hospital ownership of physician practices and
hospital choice by the patient.187 Using hospital admission data for
Medicare recipients, the authors find an increased probability that the
admitting physician refers a patient to the hospital that owns the
physician group, thereby creating an implicit payment for referral.188
Additionally, their study raises concerns about whether or not this
increased probability results in patients choosing higher cost and lower
quality hospitals when the physician group is owned by the hospital.189
In a series of papers, Carlin, Dowd, and Feldman also tested these
hypotheses, but were able to specifically test the effects of horizontal
integration as distinct from vertical integration.190 They hypothesized
183. Id. at 67–68.
184. Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is
Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756 (2014).
185. Id. at 756.
186. Id. at 762.
187. Baker et al., supra note 152.
188. Id. at 17.
189. Id.
190. Caroline S. Carlin et al., Changes in Quality of Health Care Delivery After Vertical
Integration, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1043 (2015) [hereinafter Carlin et al., Changes]; Carlin et al.,
supra note 21; Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price: Horizontal
Integration and Tied Purchasing (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://conference.nber.org/
confer//2013/HOPf13/Carlin_Feldman_Dowd.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD6R-G4YK] [hereinafter
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that further horizontal integration between newly acquired physician
groups and already-acquired physician groups may lead to higher prices
because of increased market power, as it reduces the amount of
competition in the market for physician services.191 They further
hypothesized that vertical integration between the hospital and physician
groups may lead to higher or lower prices depending on the respective
effects of tied contracting or bundling of physician and hospital services
(positive) and transaction costs (negative).192 Using a unique setting
where three multi-specialty physician clinics were acquired by two
hospital IDSs, the authors tested the effects of IDS acquisition of
physician groups (which, in their setting, necessarily includes aspects of
both vertical and horizontal integration) on physician and hospital
prices.193 They found evidence supportive of the market power
hypothesis, where physician prices increased, and some evidence
supportive of the tied contracting hypothesis, where hospital prices
increased.194
Carlin, Dowd, and Feldman used the same data and acquisition setting
to test two other relevant questions. They examined the effect of
provider consolidation first on health care quality195 and second on
physician referral patterns.196 Using cancer screening rates and ER use as
indicators of health care quality, the authors found small positive effects
on health care quality, suggesting limited increases in quality of care
measures.197 Additionally, when studying the effect of integration on
physician referral patterns, the authors found some reduction in the use
of historically-selected facilities and some increase in the use of the
acquiring IDS facilities.198
Vertical integration in the hospital setting has yielded mixed
empirical results. While some studies find efficiencies in limited
settings,199 others find an increase in prices,200 and yet others find little
Carlin et al., Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price].
191. Carlin et al., Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price, supra note 190, at 3.
192. Id. at 2–3.
193. Id. at 1.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Carlin et al., Changes, supra note 190.
196. Carlin et al., supra note 21.
197. Carlin et al., Changes, supra note 190, at 1048, 1065.
198. Carlin et al., supra note 21, at 1.
199. Federico Ciliberto & David Dranove, The Effect of Physician-Hospital Affiliations on
Hospital Prices in California, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 29, 37 (2006).
200. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the Expansion of Hospital Systems Has
Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 217 (2005).
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effect on total welfare.201 There has been scant actual empirical evidence
indicating that merger efficiencies can overcome the anticompetitive
effects created by mergers.202 Most prior work has been unable to
investigate this specific question because of a lack of data on how
mergers ultimately affect variable and marginal costs. A recent paper by
Ashenfelter, Hoskin, and Weinberg, however, had sufficient data to test
both the anticompetitive effects of a merger, as well as the potential
merger efficiencies that result.203 The authors examined a merger
between two firms in the brewing industry, Coors and Miller, and found
that “[o]n net, we find that despite reducing the number of macrobrewers
from three to two, efficiencies created by the merger offset the incentive
to increase prices in the average regional market in the long run.”204 At
least in their specific case study, the authors showed it is possible for
efficiencies to offset price increases resulting from a merger.205
Overall, both the district and appeals court in St. Luke’s ignored the
empirical analysis of physician group acquisitions. Further, a robust
discussion of efficiencies was lacking in the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the
court explained, “We remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in
general and about its scope in particular.”206 Such mistrust of efficiencies
that relies on outdated United States Supreme Court cases from the
1960s207 and ignores the acceptance of efficiencies in other circuits
where efficiencies have been addressed208 is disappointing, regardless of
whether or not the efficiencies in St. Luke’s could have saved the
merger. In order to explain efficiencies in the merger context, below we
lay out the economics of merger efficiencies as well as a case analysis of
the treatment of efficiencies by prior courts in the hospital merger
201. Robert S. Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of
Acquisitions in New York State, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 58, 58 (2006).
202. Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Efficiencies Brewed: Pricing and Consolidation in the US Beer
Industry, 46 RAND J. ECON. 328, 328–29 (2015).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 330.
205. Id. at 352; see also Dario Focarelli & Fabio Panetta, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers?
Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152 (2003) (finding that
efficiencies outweigh market power effects in the banking merger context).
206. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015).
207. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
208. See, e.g., ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d
1045, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222–24 (11th Cir.
1991).
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setting.
C.

Economics of Efficiency-Enhancing Mergers

In this Section we lay out the economics of efficiency-enhancing
mergers. We do so to set up the discussion of efficiencies in the St.
Luke’s decision in the next section. To properly set up the case-specific
efficiency discussion, we begin with first principles. Mergers among
health care providers may yield efficiencies due to cost reductions or due
to quality enhancement. In either case, total welfare may increase or
decrease depending upon how much the merger alters market structure.
This Section analyzes cost-based efficiencies, efficiency-enhancing joint
ventures among sellers and buyers, and quality-based efficiencies.
1.

Cost-Based Efficiencies

There are some instances in which a merger improves efficiency, for
example by reducing the costs of production and/or distribution.209 If the
merger does not enhance market power, the cost savings will be passed
on to some extent to consumers in the form of lower prices.210 In this
case, because both consumer welfare and total welfare are increased by
the merger, the antitrust policy should be one of benign neglect.211 In
some instances, however, the improved efficiency is accompanied by
enhanced market power, as Williamson noted in his famous exposition
on the efficiency trade-off.212 This may still result in greater output and
lower prices and, therefore, would increase both consumer welfare and
total welfare. The complication arises when there is a cost reduction due
to the efficiency accompanied by an increase in market power that leads
to a price increase above the previous level. This situation creates a need
to weigh the benefits of improved efficiency against the costs of
allocative inefficiency. The antitrust problem addressed by Williamson
provides a good illustration of the required balancing.213 The same
analysis applies to all joint ventures and agreements that are necessary to
realize the efficiency.

209. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10.
210. In the extreme case, where the market is perfectly competitive, the firm will not pass on any
firm-specific efficiency.
211. Under certain circumstances, there may be a difference in outcomes as to efficiencies as
between total welfare and consumer welfare tests. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 171, at 482–87.
212. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
213. See id.
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Efficiency-Enhancing Joint Ventures and Mergers Among Sellers

The case analyzed by Williamson illustrates the complications that
may accompany efficiency-enhancing agreements, joint ventures, and
horizontal mergers.214 In Figure 2, the pre-agreement price and quantity,
P1 and Q1, respectively, are determined by the equality of demand (D)
and the competitive supply, which is shown as MC1 = AC1. The analysis
assumes that industry marginal cost (MC1) and average cost (AC1) are
constant. The merger increases efficiency as reflected in the decrease in
costs from MC1 = AC1 to MC2 = AC2. If market power does not increase
as a result of the merger, the cost savings will be passed on to
consumers.215 The price will fall to P2 and the quantity consumed will
rise from Q1 to Q2. In this case, the merger raises no antitrust policy
concerns since the welfare effects are unambiguously positive: both
consumer welfare and total welfare increase.
Complications arise when market power increases due to an
efficiency-enhancing merger. In Figure 2, suppose that the merger leads
to the same cost savings, but that the exercise of the resulting market
power leads to an increase in price from P1 to P3 with a corresponding
decrease in quantity from Q1 to Q3. From the consumer’s perspective, the
merger appears to be clearly undesirable. The price paid rises, and the
consumer does not appear to enjoy any of the benefits from the cost
reduction. The allocative inefficiency flowing from the exercise of
market power causes consumer surplus to fall from area acP1 to area
abP3. If the lawfulness of the merger is determined solely on the basis of
consumer welfare in this market, it would be unlawful.

214. William M. Landes addresses a similar problem when a horizontal price fixing cartel
reduces transaction costs while increasing price. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for
Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983).
215. Due to the perfectly elastic competitive supply curve, all of the cost saving is passed on to
consumers when the market remains competitive. If the supply were positively-sloped, not all of the
cost saving would be passed on, but output would still rise and price would still fall.
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Figure 2

If one looks at this merger from a total welfare perspective, there are
two important observations worth making. First, whether total welfare
rises or falls depends on the relative magnitudes of the allocative
inefficiency and the cost savings. In Figure 2, the allocative inefficiency
is given by the triangular area bcd. The profit to the sellers is equal to the
rectangle P3beP2. Part of this, area P3bdP1, is a transfer from consumers
to producers and part of it represents the cost savings. Specifically, the
cost savings is given by the rectangle P1deP2. As Figure 2 is drawn, the
cost savings appears to be larger than the allocative inefficiency. In that
event, the merger should not be barred on total welfare grounds because
the benefits of the cost saving outweigh the allocative inefficiency. The
merger is Kaldor-Hicks efficient because the winners (the producers)
could compensate the losers (the consumers) and still be better off.216
But this need not always be the case. When the allocative inefficiency
outweighs the cost saving, the merger reduces both consumer welfare
and total welfare. The merger is inefficient on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
because the winners cannot profitably compensate the losers. Such a
merger should be forbidden. Since we cannot presume that the net effect
216. For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO LAW 1–7 (2d ed. 2009). For a more extensive treatment, see RICHARD E. JUST ET AL.,
THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 32–38 (2004).
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of an efficiency-enhancing agreement among rival sellers will inevitably
be positive or negative, we need reliable estimates of the cost savings as
well as of the allocative inefficiency. This is particularly daunting for
proposed mergers because both estimates are needed before the merger
is actually consummated.
Merger simulations have proved useful in many instances,217 though
they do not appear to be well-equipped to deal with the problem at
hand.218 The typical merger simulation does predict price effects before a
merger has actually occurred. These simulations, however, use estimated
demand elasticities and assumptions about the conduct of the firms to
back out calculations of a firm’s marginal cost. This makes it difficult to
incorporate the cost savings and measure the potential allocative
inefficiency. It is difficult for the analyst to estimate the cost savings a
merged firm is apt to realize without very detailed cost data and very
specialized institutional knowledge. Without specific cost estimates,
merger simulation does not address the effect of efficiency. Moreover,
estimating the potential allocative inefficiency is complicated by the fact
that a firm’s post-merger conduct may differ substantially from its premerger conduct. Consequently, it is doubtful that merger simulations are
the answer.
Further, even if one’s focus is solely on consumer welfare, the cost
savings benefit consumers generally. These cost savings do, of course,
improve the profits of the sellers in this market. But it would be a
mistake to dismiss these cost savings as of no consequence to
consumers.219 The sellers’ costs fall because fewer of society’s scarce
resources are needed to produce the output being sold.220 These
resources are then available to produce goods and services in other
markets. The consumer benefits flowing from these cost savings may be
diffused throughout the economy, but they exist nonetheless.
Below we offer some numerical examples of the potential efficiency
gains of a merger:
Assume the demand curve written as
𝑃 = 500 − 0.5𝑄
217. See Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with
New Applications, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 883 (2001) (explaining the use of merger simulation); see
also 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 6.1.
218. Dennis W. Carlton, The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and Empirical
Advances in Industrial Organization, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 61 (2003).
219. We are not counting the cost savings twice. One may dismiss them as beneficial to the
sellers, but they should be considered for their benefits to consumers.
220. We are not referring to the resources not being used because output has been reduced from
Q1 to Q3. We are instead referring to the resources now needed to produce Q3.
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The constant marginal cost (MC) and average cost (AC) written as
𝑀𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶 = 100
500 − 0.5𝑄 = 100
𝑄 ∗ = 800
The pre-merger price P* is equal to the marginal cost, i.e.,
𝑃∗ = 100
The resulting consumer surplus is
𝐶𝑆 = 1⁄2 (500 − 100)(800)
= 160,000
Following a merger, suppose that price rises to, say, 120. The quantity
would then be 760. The deadweight total welfare loss would then be
∆ = 1⁄2 (120 − 100)(800 − 760)
= 1⁄2 ((20)(40))
= 400
The minimum cost saving that would offset this welfare loss is easy
to find:
(100 − 𝑥)(760) = 400
Thus, the decrease in MC and AC (∆𝐶) is
400
760
= 0.53

∆𝐶 =

Contrary to the assertions of critics, efficiency gains that are rather
modest can completely offset a substantial increase in price. In this
example, a cost decrease of only $0.53 completely offsets the welfare
loss associated with a price increase of $20.
Consumer Welfare:
The story is quite different if we focus on consumer surplus. The premerger consumer surplus is 160,000. Following the merger and the
consequent price increase, consumer surplus falls to
𝐶𝑆2 = 1⁄2 (500 − 120)(760)
= 144,400
Thus, consumer welfare falls by 15,600.
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Profits:
Initially, the marginal cost was 10. Following the merger and the cost
saving, the economic profit is
∆𝜋 = (120 − 𝑀𝐶2 )(760)
The part attributable to the price rise is
(120 − 100)(760) = 15,200
The rest is due to the cost saving.
If the cost saving must be large enough to offset the loss in consumer
surplus, then the minimum cost saving is equal to the number that we
calculated plus the price increase. This is because the conversion of
consumer surplus to producer surplus is equal to the increase in price
times the new quantity. Is this “extraordinary” for purposes of merger
law? If so, then under the sliding scale, extraordinary efficiencies are not
that “extraordinary” in size.
3.

Welfare Effects of Quality

Quality issues are particularly difficult for courts to understand and
work through in antitrust merger cases.221 Health care hospital mergers
present particularly complex issues involving quality; the Ninth Circuit
in St. Luke’s was no different in its weak analysis of quality competition
and gave significantly less attention to quality concerns than it did to
cost-based efficiencies.222 Below we explain the economics of quality
before working through merger efficiencies more generally in case law
along both cost and quality dimensions. Firms compete on quality in
health care as fiercely as they may on price. Since the justification for a
hospital merger may rest upon quality arguments, it is important to
understand the welfare effects of quality mergers.
Some mergers may improve the quality of the hospital’s output.223
Irrespective of the welfare effects of the improved quality, neither the
antitrust agencies224 nor the courts225 will recognize these benefits unless
221. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1969, 1971 (2015).
222. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2015).
223. Quality is a general term that acquires meaning in specific context. It may refer to durability,
fit and finish, style, color fastness, taste, texture, freedom from defects, and the like.
224. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10.
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they are merger-specific. If the quality change can be realized without
the consolidation, then the efficiencies will not offset any reduction in
competition. Consequently, in what follows, the quality changes are
assumed to be merger-specific, i.e., the quality improvement is a product
of the merger and cannot be realized without the merger.
Consumers prefer higher quality over lower quality goods and
services. Thus, when quality improves, consumers are willing to pay
more for the same quantity of the good. Initially, assume that improved
quality leads to a parallel shift in demand for the good. The effect on
consumer welfare is ambiguous. In fact, consumer surplus may rise, fall,
or stay the same depending on what happens to price.
In Figure 3, D1 represents demand before the merger and the
corresponding quality improvement. The supply is not restricted by the
marginal cost (MC). The pre-merger price and quantity are P1 and Q1,
respectively. Following the merger, quality of the output improves and
demand shifts to D2. If the price rises to P2, quantity will not change. In
other words, none of the quality change is “passed on” so to speak. In
this case, consumer surplus will be unchanged. Prior to the merger,
consumer surplus was equal to the triangular area abP1. Following the
merger, consumer surplus is equal to the area of cdP2. Those two
triangular areas are precisely the same size. To be sure, the enhanced
market power leads to some allocative inefficiency because consumer
surplus would rise to ceP1 if the merger produced the quality
improvement without enhancing market power. But this is not the
relevant comparison because we assume that the quality improvement
and the enhanced market power are inextricably intertwined. Based on
this model, on economic grounds, therefore, there is no reason to
approve or disapprove the merger.

225. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v. H
& R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Figure 3

In Figure 4, D1, D2, and MC from Figure 3 have been reproduced. In
this case, however, assume that the increased market power leads to a
price increase to P2, which leads to an increase in the quantity
purchased. As long as quantity increases beyond Q1, consumer surplus
will rise. The premerger consumer surplus is again equal to the area
abP1. The post-merger consumer surplus is equal to area cdP2, which is
unambiguously larger than abP1. If the merger is accompanied by an
increase in market power, there will be some allocative inefficiency, but
this is not relevant for antitrust policy purposes. What is important is that
consumer surplus rises with the merger. On economic grounds,
therefore, this merger should be applauded.
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Figure 4

In Figure 5, the merger enhances both quality and market power.
Price rises to P2 and quantity falls to Q2. In this case, consumer surplus
necessarily falls. The pre-merger consumer surplus is, of course, area
abP1. The post-merger consumer surplus is area cdP2, which is
unambiguously smaller than area abP1. Without more, this merger
should not be approved on welfare grounds.
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Figure 5

In these three cases, the quality improvement associated with the
merger led to the same shift in demand, but the welfare changes were
driven by the extent of the increase in market power. No legitimate
inferences can be drawn from the fact that the post-merger price rose. In
the case of a parallel shift in demand, it is the quantity change that drives
the welfare result. Thus, it is tempting to use a quantity test. If the postmerger quantity will be higher, then the merger will improve consumer
welfare. If the post-merger quantity will be lower, then the welfare effect
will be negative. But such temptations should be avoided as such a
quantity analysis will not necessarily tell us about what happens to
consumer welfare.
Consider Figure 6. In this case, the improved quality causes D1 to
rotate to D3, which has been drawn to where it intersects D2 at the point
defined by P2 and Q2. Now, the relevant comparison is between the premerger consumer surplus of abP1 and the post-merger consumer surplus
of cdP2, which may well be larger than abP1. Thus, there is no easy test
unless one knows that the demand shift is parallel.
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Figure 6

These examples illustrate how changes in quality may lead to
different competitive outcomes. Such illustrations therefore suggest that
courts must undertake a careful and nuanced approach to understand the
implications of merger efficiencies. As we discuss below, most
horizontal merger cases that discuss efficiencies do not fully integrate
the economic analysis into their decision-making (at least not in the text
of the decision) and instead provide a cursory analysis.
IV.

THE LAW OF THE HORIZONTAL CASE

The economics of the horizontal case must be operationalized into
law. After all, it is the administrability of economic thought into law that
is the modern hallmark of antitrust case analysis.226 This Part works
through the judicial history of antitrust health care mergers and their
analysis of efficiencies. The analysis of efficiencies in merger analysis
shows an increasing willingness to identify where there may be

226. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13–14; William
H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 909–11 (1996).
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efficiencies. However, analysis remains uneven as between cost and
quality based efficiencies and with an understanding that both cost and
quality may be at issue in the same merger. What remains an unsettled
question of merger case law is the situation where prices go up but so
does quality.
A.

Judicial History of Antitrust Mergers in Health Care—Overview

A string of several court losses over eight years in the 1990s by
antitrust agencies in hospital mergers impacted both case law
development and policy.227 The cases used broader geographic markets
than those alleged by the government and at times came up with
different analyses relating to competitive effects than those alleged by
the government antitrust enforcers. Consequently, the courts decided
against the government antitrust enforcers in seven straight decisions.228
The series of losses by the government had some difficult to measure
effects. The sense within the practitioner community is that the losses
emboldened potential merging parties to undertake acquisitions in some
highly concentrated markets.229
An FTC retrospective study undertaken under the leadership of
Chairman Tim Muris focused on consummated mergers that might make
good candidates for government merger enforcement (as the price
effects post-merger would be known).230 The Commission found a case
it deemed worth bringing in In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Corp.,231 a post-consummated merger of Highland Park Hospital with
227. FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69
F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cty., 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121 F.3d 708 (6th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as
moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); see also California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
228. Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, FTC, Keynote Remarks at the Clayton Act 100th Anniversary
Symposium: The Clayton and FTC Acts: 100 Years of Looking Ahead 6 (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/603341/mcsweeny_-_aba_clayton_
act_100th_keynote_12-04-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK4P-NGJB] (“Prior to Evanston, the FTC and
DOJ had lost seven straight hospital merger challenges.”).
229. Thomas L. Greaney, Commentary, Competition Policy After Health Care Reform: Mending
Holes in Antitrust Law’s Protective Net, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 898 (2015).
230. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks Before the 7th Annual Competition in Health
Care Forum: Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century (Nov.
7,
2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JE6B-6NG6].
231. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1 (2007).
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Evanston Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital.232 Together the merged
entity became Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation. FTC
brought an administrative complaint,233 and an ALJ found the merger to
be anti-competitive,234 which the Commission affirmed.235 Evanston
brought about a shift in the courts. Since that time, the government has
won more cases, blocking hospital mergers236 and chilling potential
mergers. We provide this background of health care antitrust mergers to
offer context for a discussion of the development of efficiencies in
antitrust merger case law.
Antitrust doctrine shifted starting in the 1970s to take efficiencies
seriously in both merger and conduct cases.237 The belief in efficiencies
outweighing anti-competitive effects underscores the paradigm shift in
antitrust that began in the 1970s. This belief both by the antitrust
agencies and courts has continued to the present. Under current antitrust
doctrine for both mergers and conduct, efficiencies are an integral part of
antitrust. In the merger context, though efficiencies perhaps have not
provided the sole justification for particular merger cases (though
efficiencies should have carried the day for the parties in the case of
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.,238 discussed below), efficiencies have been a
staple of analysis of mergers in the various iterations of the Merger
Guidelines, as we explore below, as well as in understanding the rule of
reason more generally.239 The Ninth Circuit’s hostile reading of merger
efficiencies in St. Luke’s also goes against the antitrust jurisprudence of
the past thirty years.240 To be sure, efficiencies rarely come up in
232. Id. at 2–3.
233. Id. at 1.
234. Id. at 23 (finding that “Complaint Counsel proved that the challenged merger has
substantially lessened competition in the product market of general acute inpatient services [sold to
managed care organizations] and in the geographic market of the seven hospitals described above”).
235. Id. at 1.
236. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica
Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp.
2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Reading Health Sys., No. 9353 (F.T.C. Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/12/121207
readingsircmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3423-WMRJ] (Order Dismissing Complaint); Inova Health
Sys. Found., 145 F.T.C. 366 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/
06/080617orderdismisscmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LZ8-4KK8] (Order Dismissing Complaint).
237. Blair & Sokol, supra note 39, at 2515.
238. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
239. See generally Kovacic, supra note 226.
240. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10 (providing an overview); see also William J. Kolasky &
Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 235 (2003) (“This review of the case law shows that
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practice in terms of litigated cases, as we will explore below in greater
detail.241
B.

Case Law Treatment of Merger Efficiencies

Case law holds that efficiencies may be used to rebut a claim for
preliminary injunction.242 Yet, both the district court and Ninth Circuit in
St. Luke’s suffered from some fundamental problems of understanding
the legal role of efficiencies in merger analysis. Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit was hostile to efficiencies.243
Efficiencies came into play as part of a procedural burden shift. First,
the plaintiff needs to establish a prima facie case. Then, the burden shifts
to the defendant to put forth evidence rebutting the alleged anticompetitive effects of the merger. This burden-shifting approach was
embodied in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.244 The Ninth Circuit
began its efficiencies analysis with the statement that efficiencies are
technically illegal under United States Supreme Court case law.245 The
decision then expressed doubt that the efficiencies analysis overall246 is
problematic. By framing merger efficiencies this way, the Ninth Circuit
consciously devalued efficiencies in a way that is detrimental to how
antitrust works in practice.
In earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court was hostile to efficiency
claims and even used efficiencies as a justification to challenge a merger
because small, inefficient competitors could be harmed by the

the Merger Guidelines have been influential in shaping the courts’ approach to efficiencies, just as
they have been in other areas. The courts have followed the agencies’ lead in accepting that
efficiencies may be used, in appropriate circumstances, to rebut a prima facie case of illegality
based on presumptions drawn from market shares and concentration ratios. The courts have also
adopted the same basic analytical framework as the Guidelines, sometimes citing the Guidelines,
but also often relying on the Areeda-Turner treatise, on which the current Guidelines approach is
largely modeled.”). We note, however, that the current living author of the treatise, Herb
Hovenkamp recently explained, “Although more empirical work needs to be done, what we have so
far suggests that current merger policy if anything underestimates competitive harm, exaggerates
passed-on efficiencies, or some combination of both.” Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger
Efficiencies 29 (Sept. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664266
[https://perma.cc/VA7W-M696].
241. FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 72 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that “courts have
rarely, if ever, denied a preliminary injunction solely based on the likely efficiencies”).
242. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720.
243. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015).
244. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
245. Id. at 989–90.
246. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791.
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efficiencies.247 Technically still good case law, “[p]ossible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality” under FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,248 a case where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
government, because the merger would reduce advertising costs.249 This
reading of efficiencies merger law was upheld in the Ninth Circuit in
1979 in RSR Corp. v. FTC.250 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not
cleaned up these old cases, although all other circuits that have weighed
in on merger efficiencies recognize their importance.251
This framing of efficiencies as invalid as a defense to guide case law
is important given the emphasis that the Ninth Circuit decision gave to
its harsh language on efficiencies in the St. Luke’s case.252 This is not to
suggest that efficiencies had no value until the 1980s. The 1968 DOJ
Merger Guidelines allowed for a rather limited efficiencies defense.253
Similarly, the Supreme Court began to recognize efficiencies in the
conduct area starting in the late 1970s.254
Nevertheless, only in the 1980s did merger case law shift to begin to
acknowledge that efficiencies might serve as a possible “defense.”255
The 1982256 and 1984257 Merger Guidelines also re-established
efficiencies as a “defense.”258 Although the DOJ 1982 Guidelines
247. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
248. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
249. Id. at 580 (arguing that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but
it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition”).
250. 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).
251. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2057–67 (providing an overview of the case evolution).
252. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d
775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015).
253. 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 8 (“Unless there are exceptional
circumstances, the Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisition normally subject
to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim that the merger will produce economies
(i.e., improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons, (i) the Department’s adherence to
the standards will usually result in no challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to
involve companies operating significantly below the size necessary to achieve significant economies
of scale; (ii) where substantial economies are potentially available to a firm, they can normally be
realized through internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in accurately
establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a merger.” (emphasis added)).
254. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
255. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10.
256. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § V (1982), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YTW-FGJV] [hereinafter 1982
MERGER GUIDELINES].
257. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984).
258. Id. at 26,834, § 3.5.
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offered a limited defense in “extraordinary cases,”259 the 1984 DOJ
Merger Guidelines marked a further shift. Efficiencies were no longer a
stand-alone defense as such but were part of the competitive effects
analysis that the agency would undertake for a potential merger. A list of
criteria for which efficiencies would be evaluated under the 1984 Merger
Guidelines offered something of a roadmap to potential merging
parties.260 The 1984 Merger Guidelines explained that the “efficiencyenhancing potential . . . [of mergers] can increase the competitiveness of
firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”261 In doing so, the 1984
Guidelines noted that it never ignored efficiency claims.262 Subsequent
to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, case law that examined merger
efficiencies played a minor role through the rest of the 1980s.263
Efficiencies resurfaced in 1991 in the health care antitrust context for
a merger in Georgia. The Eleventh Circuit in FTC v. University Health,
Inc.264 noted that “an efficiency defense to the government’s prima facie
case in section 7 challenges is appropriate in certain circumstances.”265
The Eleventh Circuit added, “[w]e conclude that in certain
circumstances, a defendant may rebut the government’s prima facie case
with evidence showing that the intended merger would create significant
efficiencies in the relevant market.”266 This case is important because
courts have repeatedly cited University Health in health care mergers.267

259. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 240, at 218, 220 (offering a description and critique of the
changes in efficiencies in the merger guidelines).
260. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834, § 3.5 (“Cognizable efficiencies include, but
are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant
specialization, lower transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing,
servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms. The Department may also consider
claimed efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and overhead
expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution
operations of the merging firms, although, as a practical matter, these types of efficiencies may be
difficult to demonstrate.”).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 26,835.
263. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2058–61.
264. 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
265. Id. at 1222.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Saint
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir.
2015); ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Tenet Healthcare
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill.
2012); HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997); FTC
v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121 F.3d 708 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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University Health articulated that efficiencies could be based on price,
quality, and new products.268 Further, it articulated the criteria for
cognizable efficiencies from the deal as merger-specific efficiencies that
are verifiable and “do not arise from anti-competitive reductions in
output or service.”269 The efficiencies also needed to be merger-specific
in the sense that something less than a full merger could not accomplish
the same outcome.270 Case law has recognized the efficiencies as laid out
in the merger guidelines and adopted the 1992/1997 and 2000 Merger
Guideline’s approach to the efficiencies inquiry.271
Though the 2010 Merger Guidelines revised the approach to merger
analysis, the efficiencies section of the 2010 Guidelines (renumbered
Section 10) remained mostly untouched.272 Yet, efficiencies are also
mentioned in earlier sections of the Guidelines. In section 2.2.1 the
agencies state that they will “look for reliable evidence” of merger
efficiencies.273 This includes that “[t]he Agencies give careful
consideration to the views of individuals whose responsibilities,
expertise, and experience relating to the issues in question provide
particular indicia of reliability. The financial terms of the transaction
may also be informative regarding competitive effects.”274 Beyond this
list of evidence, the details of what sort of information constitutes
efficiencies is not clearly spelled out. Similarly, section 6.1, which
discusses merger simulation models, allows the agencies to incorporate
merger efficiencies into their models.275
The remainder of the efficiencies analysis is articulated in section
10.276 According to the formulation of the Guidelines, the efficiencies
must be specific to the merger, cognizable to the merger (merger

268. See, for example, sources cited supra note 267.
269. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
merger-review/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/26G5-HRMM].
270. Id. at 31 n.35 (“The Agency will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be
preserved by practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or
licensing. If a merger affects not whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved, only the
timing advantage is a merger-specific efficiency.”).
271. See Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2063–67; D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin,
Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 51–53
(2011).
272. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271, at 54.
273. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 2.2.1.
274. Id.
275. Id. § 6.1.
276. Id. § 10.
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specific), and verifiable.277 Since the issuance of the 2010 Guidelines,
various courts have cited to this in dicta.278 In health care, the types of
efficiency claims tend to include:
improved quality of care, including improved patient outcomes,
avoidance of capital expenditures, consolidation of management
and operations support jobs, consolidation of specific services to
one location (e.g., all cardiac care at hospital A and all cancer
treatment at hospital B), and reduction of operational costs (e.g.,
savings in purchasing or accounting costs).279
In the previous Part, we discussed the economics of efficiencies and
provided a numerical example of how little change is necessary for
significant efficiencies to emerge from a merger. Yet, the 2010 Merger
Guidelines, adopting the language of the 1997 addition to the 1992
Merger Guidelines, suggest a sliding scale that seems to require
“extraordinary” efficiencies for the efficiencies to overcome the anticompetitive effects.280 As the 2010 Merger Guidelines explain:
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the
magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive effect
of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and
the more they must be passed through to customers, for the
Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential
adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly
substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies would
be necessary to prevent the merger from being
anticompetitive.281
The Guidelines go even further in expressing skepticism of what
extraordinary efficiencies might ever exist. The Guidelines state, “In the
Agencies’ experience efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in
merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the
efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to
monopoly or near-monopoly.”282 Perhaps because of the agencies’ own
skepticism, in spite of a sliding scale for efficiencies, courts have not
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011).
Feinstein et al., supra note 93, at 882.
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10.
Id.
Id.
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clearly articulated what constitutes “extraordinary efficiencies.”283 The
lack of guidance of what this might mean prevents effective planning. If
“extraordinary efficiencies” are possible (as they probably should have
been found to have been in Heinz), then there should be an articulation
of what such a standard may be in the case law.
Of all of the litigated merger cases since the introduction of the
efficiencies section of the 1992 Merger Guidelines, only one case,
Heinz, has provided significant analysis to the efficiencies.284 The case
involved a three-to-two merger of baby food companies between the
number two and three players in the market (Heinz and Beechnut), in
which the market leader was Gerber.285 In what was a national market,
supermarkets always carried the market leading Gerber.286 However,
supermarkets rarely carried all three baby food companies.
Both Heinz and Beechnut had advantages, one in the quality of the
baby food and the other in more efficient production facilities.287 The
parties suggested that the efficiencies from the merger would be in the
range of $9.4–12 million due to moving all production to the Heinz
manufacturing facility in Pittsburgh (and shutting down an antiquated
plant in upstate New York).288 The variable cost savings of the
manufacturing consolidation and plant closure would have created a
forty-three percent variable cost reduction.289 The parties also claimed
efficiencies in distribution of fifteen percent due to the proposed
merger.290 In contrast, the FTC made a number of claims. These claims
included: (1) that the efficiencies did not outweigh the anti-competitive
effects, (2) that these efficiencies were not cognizable to the merger, and
(3) that such efficiencies could have been achieved through other
means.291 The district court ruled in favor of the merging parties based
upon the efficiency claims and denied the FTC request for a preliminary
injunction to block the merger. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding.292 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit found that the
283. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271, at 60 (“What has not been discussed at length in the
literature, agency speeches and policy statements, the Commentary, the Merger Guidelines, or case
law is a detailed analysis of the application of the sliding scale approach . . . .”).
284. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–24 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
285. Id. at 711–13; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192–94 (D.D.C. 2000).
286. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
287. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721.
288. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
289. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721.
290. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
291. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720–21.
292. Id.
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merging parties could not prove that the efficiencies outweighed the
anti-competitive effects of the proposed transaction under the 1992/97
Merger Guidelines.293
A number of hospital merger cases prior to the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines have discussed efficiencies but in a more limited
way.294 Many of these cases and their nuances were not cited by St.
Luke’s district and circuit court decisions in terms of determining both
the cost and quality based efficiencies. Overall, the analysis of
efficiencies in both wins and losses for the government in health care
cases have demonstrated a cursory analysis of efficiencies that is much
shorter than other parts of the competitive effects analysis.
Perhaps courts’ analyses of efficiencies are not surprising if the cases
that go to litigation and that get decided are atypical cases—so one sided
that there is a selection bias and where the parties cannot overcome the
merger burden shift of Baker Hughes. This shift first requires the
plaintiff make a prima facie case of illegality followed by a burden shift
to the merging parties to show efficiencies.295 However, the fact that the
merging parties do not abandon the transaction suggests that they believe
they can overcome the structural presumption. If this is the case, the
parties often believe that they have compelling merger efficiencies. Even
if the parties overestimate their chances of success, at least in some
cases, the efficiencies must be real enough that the parties are willing to
spend the financial resources to go to court based on their assessment of
the case. If so, the overly light (and often simplistic) treatment of
efficiencies by the courts suggests that unlike an issue like market
definition, courts feel uncomfortable in analyzing the efficiencies of a
particular hospital merger. The lack of comfort with a serious
efficiencies analysis condemns potentially pro-competitive mergers.
Without a clearer sense of what efficiencies count in the courts and what
efficiencies might be “extraordinary,” unnecessary deal uncertainty leads
to suboptimal antitrust policy.
Though the 2010 Merger Guidelines were not meant to be applied in a
step-by-step fashion,296 this is exactly how courts have undertaken their
293. Id. at 721–22.
294. See infra this Section.
295. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
296. The Commentary explained that “[e]ach of the Guidelines’ sections identifies a distinct
analytical element that the Agencies apply in an integrated approach to merger review. The ordering
of these elements in the Guidelines, however, is not itself analytically significant, because the
Agencies do not apply the Guidelines as a linear, step-by-step progression that invariably starts with
market definition and ends with efficiencies or failing assets.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/
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analysis in merger cases, proceeding linearly through each factor.297 In
the cases to date under the 2010 Merger Guidelines, by the time that
courts reached efficiencies, often they had made up their minds about the
competitive effects without engaging in serious analysis of the
efficiencies. The 2010 Merger Guidelines were supposed to correct for
this bias.
C.

Hospital Merger Efficiencies—An Assessment of the Cases

Since the introduction of efficiencies as part of the competitive effects
analysis, a number of courts have grappled with how to assess the
efficiencies regarding both cost and quality, as we note below.298
Overall, our assessment is that courts consider cost-based efficiencies in
greater depth than quality-based efficiencies. Nevertheless, no court has
yet found efficiencies that overcome the presumption in Baker Hughes.
Similarly, no case has overcome anti-competitive effects as part of the
sliding scale that is “extraordinary.”299
We begin with an analytical summary of the health care cases and
their discussion of efficiencies. The FTC lost In re Adventist Health
System/West300 before an administrative law judge. In that case, the
judge found efficiencies that outweighed the anti-competitive effects.301
This was based on the scale efficiencies that the two small hospitals
would have with regard to price. The judge also discussed quality
efficiencies in the form of achieved efficiencies by reduced patient
length of stay through improved case management.302 Yet, the
efficiencies discussion was short relative to other claims.
In FTC v. Freeman Hospital,303 the district court found that there
would be efficiencies based on economies of scale of the merging parties

commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/38RK-ZMVT].
297. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1, 459 (2007) (“Although the courts discuss
merger analysis as a step-by-step process, the steps are, in reality, interrelated factors, each designed
to enable the fact-finder to determine whether a transaction is likely to create or enhance existing
market power.”).
298. See infra this Section.
299. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
300. Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224 (1994).
301. Id. at 277–78 (“[C]onclude that the full consolidation of UAH and UGH would result, over
time, in significant cost savings as compared with the cost which would be incurred by UGH and
UAH if they were to operate as separate facilities.”).
302. Id. at 276.
303. 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
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in a relatively short paragraph.304 There was no discussion of qualitybased efficiencies.
The merger in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.305 of hospitals in
Grand Rapids, Michigan had both cost and quality efficiencies
arguments. Cost-based efficiencies received a significant analysis. The
court reasoned that “[t]he parties’ experts have provided detailed
estimates of the capital expenditure savings and operating efficiencies
that would be realized by defendants in the event of merger.”306 The
court devoted eight paragraphs to its discussion of cost-based
efficiencies.
Regarding quality efficiencies, Butterworth pledged “to provide
quality healthcare programs for the underserved without regard to ability
to pay.”307 The court’s discussion on quality efficiencies was sparse.
However, the court noted that “[w]hile both hospitals are presently wellmaintained, there is no question that the physical limitations of the
Blodgett site significantly hinder Blodgett’s ability to continue to
successfully compete with Butterworth and attract the best qualified
physicians as medical services and technology continue to evolve.”308
Both the cost and quality efficiencies convinced the court that the
merger should be permitted to provide for “world-class” facilities in
western Michigan.309
In United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,310 DOJ
challenged the merger of Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North
Shore Health Systems, Inc.311 The court found for the merging parties.
After a lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the cost-based
efficiencies warranted allowing the merger.312 The court also
incorporated quality-based arguments (in a much shorter analysis) as a
justification for allowing the merger. The court did so based on the non-

304. Id. at 1224.
305. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121
F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
306. Id. at 1300.
307. Id. at 1306.
308. Id. at 1301.
309. Id. at 1302.
310. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
311. Id. at 125.
312. Id. at 148 (“Among these merger-related savings are: a reduction in personnel in various
departments of both hospitals, including the financial departments and pain management; some
reduction in the cost of clinical laboratory services and medical supplies; claims recovery costs and
utilities; laundry costs; in-house consulting services; and computer and information services. Also,
there will be some capital avoidance savings in amounts difficult to ascertain.”).
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profit status of the hospitals, and the mission of the merging parties,
which was “to provide high quality health care to economically
disadvantaged and elderly members of the community.”313
The FTC challenged a hospital merger in Poplar Bluff, Missouri in
FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.314 At the district court level, the court
took the merging parties to task for failing to provide compelling
evidence for supposed cost-based savings based on reducing excess bed
capacity, consolidating services, and reducing staffing.315 The merging
parties also claimed potential quality efficiencies based on scale
economies. These economies of scale would allow for increased
numbers of tertiary medical services, such as open heart surgery, but that
such efficiencies were out of market efficiencies (since primary care was
the relevant market).316 Finally the court reasoned that the cost-based
efficiencies would not be passed on to consumers.317
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reexamined the efficiencies findings of
the lower court.318 It noted, “[w]e further find that although Tenet’s
efficiencies defense may have been properly rejected by the district
court, the district court should nonetheless have considered evidence of
enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the
merger.”319 In a sense, the Eighth Circuit was concerned that the lower
court’s analysis of efficiencies was spotty. In fact, this is exactly the
problem that the overview of cases show more generally—courts pay too
little attention to the efficiencies analysis. In Tenet, in particular, the
Eighth Circuit noted that the lower court did not effectively examine the
quality efficiencies, noting that “[t]he reality of the situation in our
changing healthcare environment may be that Poplar Bluff cannot
support two high-quality hospitals.”320 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
discussed that the lower court placed “an inordinate emphasis on price
competition”321 rather than on quality competition.

313. Id. at 149. Subsequent empirical work suggests that the non-profit story is mixed. See Jill R.
Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Hospital Ownership and Medical Services: Market Mix, Spillover
Effects, and Nonprofit Objectives, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 924 (2009); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust
and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2008).
314. 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
315. Id. at 948.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
319. Id. at 1054.
320. Id. at 1055.
321. Id. at 1054, 1055.
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In In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., the merging
parties offered quality improvements in the form of a $120 million
investment and the expansion of services in over sixteen service areas.322
As this was a post-consummated merger challenge, the FTC countered
that quality had not actually improved.323 Where there were quality
improvements, the FTC argued that the quality improvements could
have been reached short of a merger.324 The FTC also argued that the
purported quality improvements could not justify the post-merger price
increases.325 Nevertheless, quality claims seem to carry some weight for
the FTC even though the Commission voted that the merger was anticompetitive. The Commission could have sought structural separation,
as FTC complaint counsel had sought (and which we think probably was
the correct remedy). However, the Commission noted that full
divestiture was not advisable because the improvement in cardiac
surgery at Highland Park (a quality efficiency) would not have been
sustainable with a divestiture because the lack of scale economies would
have meant that the necessary volume without the merger would not
have been possible.326
After the issuance of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, additional hospital
merger cases have explored efficiencies, as we explain herein. One such
case was FTC v. OSF Healthcare System,327 a merger from three to two
hospitals in Rockford, Illinois.328 In that case, the defendants claimed
two types of cost-based efficiencies. The first was recurring cost savings
due to consolidation (economies of scale).329 The second was cost
savings based upon one-time capital avoidance savings.330 The court
undertook a significant analysis of both types of purported cost
efficiencies before holding that neither efficiency was extraordinary to
overcome the structural presumption of anti-competitive effects.331 In
contrast, the court gave short shrift to the quality efficiencies. These
quality efficiencies were perhaps more compelling than the cost-based
efficiencies. The quality improvements could lead to clinical

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1, 507 (2007).
Id. at 510–11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521–22.
852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 1089–92.
Id.
Id. at 1088–95.
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effectiveness. The court dismissed this claim.332 The parties also argued
a second quality claim, that the merger would result in “Centers of
Excellence” that would allow the merged hospital to recruit
specialists.333 The court also dismissed this claimed efficiency in short
order as too speculative and which might be possible short of a
merger.334 Another case was a trial court decision in FTC v. ProMedica
Health System, Inc.,335 in which the court below found no efficiencies.336
Overall, the hospital merger cases show that courts rarely spend much
focus on their analysis of efficiencies. Often the efficiencies analysis is a
throw-away section of a decision—merely a summary, rather than an indepth analysis of issues that is customary in other areas of the analysis,
like defining the relevant product market or questions of entry for
example.
D.

Efficiencies in St. Luke’s

The district court judge in St. Luke’s identified that the ACA
was driving a push to efficiencies in health care.337 However, while
noting the benefits of consolidation, the court found the limits to the
specific claimed efficiencies based on the 2010 Merger Guidelines. The
district court misidentified the efficiencies as a defense rather than as
part of the competitive effects analysis.338 This misreads how
efficiencies have been treated since the 1984 Merger Guidelines, when
efficiencies were first treated as a factor in the competitive analysis
rather than as a defense.339 FTC v. University Health, Inc. was the first
circuit court case to make a more significant embrace of merger
efficiencies as a way to rebut claims of anti-competitive effects.340
The St. Luke’s district court judge did recognize the difficulty in
adjudicating the case. Given the difficulty of unraveling post-

332. Id. at 1092–93.
333. Id. at 1093.
334. Id. at 1093–94.
335. No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011).
336. Id. at *57–60.
337. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d
775 (9th Cir. 2015).
338. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778
F.3d 775, 788–93 (9th Cir. 2015).
339. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834 (June 29, 1984); Greene & Sokol,
supra note 10, at 2059.
340. See Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2061–62
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consummated mergers, one concluding remark by the judge was
interesting:
In a world that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best
result might be to approve the Acquisition and monitor its
outcome to see if the predicted price increases actually occurred.
In other words, the Acquisition could serve as a controlled
experiment.
But the Clayton Act is in full force, and it must be enforced.
The Act does not give the Court discretion to set it aside to
conduct a health care experiment.341
The stakes in health care are high and because the so-called
unscrambling of a merger by remedying a merger that already has been
consummated is not easy,342 this may explain the sustained importance
of the structural presumption for mergers.
If the numerical example we explained earlier via formal proof is
correct, then the efficiencies needed to be “extraordinary” are not that
large. This also changes what the government would need to weigh in
deciding whether or not to bring a challenge. Put differently, are there no
price increases with quality improvements that may overcome the anticompetitive effects? According to government enforcers, this situation
has only been a hypothetical one.343 Based on our numerical example,
such a hypothetical may in fact be possible.
On appeal, the use of efficiencies in the Ninth Circuit was questioned
at its most basic level by the circuit court panel.344 The opinion stated,
“[w]e remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in general and
about its scope in particular.”345 The Ninth Circuit has been more critical
of efficiencies analysis than any other circuit in the modern antitrust era.
Not only was the Ninth Circuit unduly skeptical of efficiencies, it may
have been wrong as to the case law. Put differently, even as a matter of
law, the Ninth Circuit overplays its claim that merger efficiencies are
illegal.346 At least implicitly, efficiencies in the merger context have
341. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25.
342. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1 (2007) (exemplifying the difficulty in
remedying a successful post-consummated merger challenge).
343. Feinstein et al., supra note 93, at 883 (“However, it is more difficult to determine how best
to balance a possible price increase, on the one hand, and a quality improvement, on the other hand.
To date, however, that is not something the federal antitrust agencies have had to do.”).
344. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778
F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 788–89 (“The Supreme Court has never expressly approved an efficiencies defense to
a § 7 claim. Indeed, Brown Shoe cast doubt on the defense.”).
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been recognized by the Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc.347 In Cargill, the issue was antitrust injury in the merger
context.348 The Court explained, “[t]o hold that the antitrust laws protect
competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition
[because of efficiencies] would, in effect, render illegal any decision by
a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share.”349 The Court went
on to explain, “[t]he antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for
‘[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage
in vigorous price competition, including price competition.’”350
We note a further problem with the Ninth’s Circuit’s efficiency
analysis. The Ninth Circuit noted that prices might go up post-merger.351
The court did not grapple with the issue of how to deal with price
increases on the one hand and improved quality of service on the other.
Quite the opposite. The Ninth Circuit explained:
But even if we assume that the claimed efficiencies were
merger-specific, the defense would nonetheless fail. At most, the
district court concluded that St. Luke’s might provide better
service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, but
the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition
or create monopolies simply because the merged entity can
improve its operations.352
Such language is unfortunate. Lacking in the opinion was a way to
address the situation of improved quality but increased price. Such a
situation of the interplay of different types of efficiencies and anticompetitive effects in the context of the sliding scale, had the merging
parties assertions of efficiencies been true, would have presented a novel
issue, one where the merging parties claimed quality enhancing merger
efficiencies in their electronic records system (even if price might have
increased).
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Antitrust health care merger law remains unnecessarily murky after
the St. Luke’s appellate decision. It does so in a number of areas. The
proper use of efficiencies to rebut the prima facie merger challenge is
347. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 116.
350. Id. (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.
1984)).
351. See St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791.
352. Id. at 791–92.
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less in line with economic theory than it need be. It may be that there is
an impressive analysis of competitive effects and efficiencies before the
agencies.353 Before the courts, the competitive effects analysis
(particularly efficiencies analysis) provided in St. Luke’s is an accurate
(albeit lamentable) reflection of how competitive effects get analyzed
before the courts. In such cases, courts stick to the Baker Hughes
formulation as embodied in Heinz without a detailed analysis of what
extraordinary efficiencies would entail.354 This set of presumptions in
the case law may explain why we do not see efficiencies realized in
decided court cases—it could be selection effect of the cases that go to
trial are not the ones with the strongest efficiencies; it could be the
procedural presumptions; or it could be that the efficiencies are real but
judges simply discount them. The cases suggest in terms of the amount
of text offered for efficiencies that judges are discounting efficiencies in
their analysis. Before the agencies, in contrast, efficiencies seem to be
taken seriously.355
In a recent paper, Professor Hovenkamp summarizes the ambiguity of
efficiencies under the current statutory scheme.356 He explains:
The “substantially lessen competition” language in § 7 is not
353. We do not reject the possibility that the best cases for efficiencies are those that the antitrust
agencies accept by not challenging a proposed merger. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Statement of
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Delta Air
Lines’ Acquisition of an Equity Interest in Virgin Atlantic Airways (June 20, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-itsinvestigation-delta [https://perma.cc/6QR6-YX8S].
354. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“In United States v. Baker
Hughes Inc., we explained the analytical approach by which the government establishes a section 7
violation. First the government must show that the merger would produce ‘a firm controlling an
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market.’ Such a showing establishes a ‘presumption’ that the merger
will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce
evidence that ‘show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s]
probable effects on competition’ in the relevant market. ‘If the defendant successfully rebuts the
presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect
shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with
the government at all times.’ Although Baker Hughes was decided at the merits stage as opposed to
the preliminary injunctive relief stage, we can nonetheless use its analytical approach in evaluating
the Commission’s showing of likelihood of success.” (internal citations omitted)).
355. See MALCOM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, ECONOMIC ISSUES: MERGER EFFICIENCIES
AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1997–2007 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/merger-efficiencies-federal-trade-commission-1997–2007/0902
mergerefficiencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X2X-VSU9]; Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks
at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2002 Fall Forum: Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of
Ongoing Evolution (Nov. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2002/11/efficiencies-andantitrust-story-ongoing-evolution [https://perma.cc/E6MM-HDX7].
356. See Hovenkamp, supra note 240.
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self-defining, and it has meant different things at different times.
Lessening competition could be a reference to simple rivalry, or
the number of firms in a market. In that case every horizontal
merger lessens competition by reducing the number of rivals.
The statutory phrase might also refer to general welfare, which
would trade off possible consumer injuries against efficiency
gains. Finally, it could be a reference to output and lower prices:
a merger “substantially” lessens competition if it reduces output
in the market, with the result that prices rise. This definition
comes closest to the approach to merger policy reflected in the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and applied today by the
antitrust enforcement Agencies and courts.357
If Hovenkamp is correct that there are multiple potential meanings to
exploring efficiencies under the law and that the Merger Guidelines
focus on reduction of output, this leads to some potential concern for
antitrust policy. First, courts and agencies do not seem to properly grasp
how to address quality-based efficiencies—what to measure and how to
apply this if quality goes up even while cost remains the same or even
increases.
Without a clear goal as to what quality efficiencies mean, it is
difficult to block a merger that reduces quality. Similarly, it is difficult to
credit efficiencies to a merger that would enhance quality. This is a hard
task because quality can mean so many things depending on the context.
The most administrable quality measurement is what the federal
government already uses for CMS. However, that fails to include many
other important types of quality competition. Quantifying quality-based
efficiencies is not an easy task. As Dafny explains, “Quantifying these
benefits is particularly difficult because of the dearth of relevant
empirical research and the lack of consensus on what should be
measured and what value should be assigned to it.”358 Yet, this
quantification is important to provide an effective counter-story to the
anti-competitive effects analysis. If the agencies and courts provided
clearer and more specific guidance of what quality efficiencies to
measure, merging parties might better collect data to prove a quality
enhancing efficiencies argument.
To operationalize a workable legal test is very difficult on quality
enhancing efficiencies. However, the test should not focus on the
specific quality in question. The test should allow any form of
quantifiable quality efficiencies. The administrability in the test comes

357. Id. at 3.
358. Dafny, supra note 20, at 198.
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from a better articulation of what sort of efficiencies may be required
under the “sliding scale”359 that courts mention but do not articulate a
test for along these lines.
Unfortunately, the ultimate end game of the sliding scale is not clear.
That is, there is no clear definition in case law or agency guidance
regarding what extraordinary efficiencies might mean. Such guidance
would be helpful.360 To suggest that efficiencies need to be extraordinary
without explaining what extraordinary means allows courts, such as the
appellate court in St. Luke’s, to question whether efficiencies that would
outweigh the competitive effects could ever exist. This opening allowed
the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s to provide unwarranted and overly harsh
criticism of efficiencies that fly in the face of forty years of efficiencies
in both mergers and conduct cases.361
Efficiencies are challenging before agencies and courts. As one court
explained, “[t]his de facto defense is a difficult one to pursue because
the alleged efficiencies are often speculative and vigorously disputed by
the testimony of contradicting experts. In addition, the extent to which
these efficiencies would endure to the benefit of the consumer is often
difficult to measure.”362 The reality is that efficiencies work before the
agency if the data is strong. As Chairman Ramirez recently stated,
[i]n a number of cases, efficiencies have played a role in our
decision not to take action against proposed mergers. Moreover,
the cases that we bring tend to be ones with evidence of
significant anticompetitive effects that are unlikely to be offset
by the routine, garden-variety efficiency claims we typically
encounter from parties.363
Nevertheless, agency pronouncements on the types of efficiency
arguments that have worked (and more than just a line or two in a press
release) would be helpful to the practitioner community in providing
guidance.
At least in the Ninth Circuit, using efficiencies arguments to
overcome the Baker Hughes presumption is difficult if not impossible.
359. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271.
360. See id.
361. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778
F.3d 775, 788–93 (9th Cir. 2015); Shelanski, supra note 7.
362. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
363. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Global Antitrust
Enforcement Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Five Years Later (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
805441/ramirez__georgetown_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_9-29-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BT4-687F].
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The reliance on “hot documents”364 in court, rather than focusing on the
empirical data, means that the antitrust agencies are sacrificing good
case law analysis for storytelling to win cases.365 This has gone on for
some time, most notably in United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.366 Not
surprisingly, judges focus not on the complex economics of cases but on
the bad documents because it provides them an analytical shortcut to
reach their preferred outcome. Even if the merging parties could not
prove the efficiencies in St. Luke’s, the lack of a serious focus on the
efficiencies deters those mergers that are close calls for the agencies. In
the future, such mergers will not be contemplated, which will ultimately
hurt consumers.
Bilateral monopoly and vertical merger issues also remain important
issues for further analysis. When properly identified, a situation of
bilateral monopoly is superior from a welfare perspective than a prior
market structure.367 In situations in which merging parties argue that
increased provider concentration is important to counteract the power of
payers (insurers), understanding when bilateral monopoly does and does
not exist plays a critical role in analyzing the competitive effects of a
potential merger. The St. Luke’s case did not sufficiently grapple with
this set of claims. This lack of sophisticated analysis is disappointing
because the contours of the power-buyer analysis in the Merger
Guidelines remains under-explored in decided cases.368
Further, issues of foreclosure remain ones that lack contemporary
guidance in merger case law. Ever since the game theory revolution and

364. David A. Balto, ‘Hot’ Documents Do Not Tell the Whole Story in Antitrust, LAW360 (Apr. 9,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/430886/hot-documents-do-not-tell-the-whole-story-inantitrust [https://perma.cc/9YL8-LEGM] (describing “hot documents”).
365. Michael Cohen, Comments of Michael Cohen on Bazaarvoice, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION
POL’Y
BLOG
(Jan.
27,
2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/
2014/01/comments-of-michael-cohen-on-bazaarvoice.html [https://perma.cc/3WCE-RVAZ] (“One
lesson of Bazaarvoice may be the simple conclusion that bad documents—of any sort—will land a
merger in court, regardless of whether the case should be there.”).
366. See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13–CV–00133–WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
367. See Blair & Sokol, Rule of Reason, supra note 171, at 493.
368. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 12 (“The Agencies consider the possibility that
powerful buyers may constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise prices. This can occur, for
example, if powerful buyers have the ability and incentive to vertically integrate upstream or
sponsor entry, or if the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines coordinated effects.
However, the Agencies do not presume that the presence of powerful buyers alone forestalls adverse
competitive effects flowing from the merger. Even buyers that can negotiate favorable terms may be
harmed by an increase in market power.”); see also John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and
Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1483 (2012).
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a series of papers that examine vertical foreclosure in mergers,369 there
have been a set of theoretical articles that challenged the Chicago belief
that vertical mergers should be nearly per se legal.370 What might
constitute practical guidance from case law would better settle these
questions. Such guidance could take the form of consents (rather
problematic because of the desire of parties to settle to get a deal
through) rather than modern vertical merger guidelines or case law.371 St.
Luke’s could have provided such a decided case based analysis but did
not. The development of policy via merger consent decrees and the
potential anti-competitive effects of some of these consents may follow
directly from the lack of effective case law treatment of vertical merger
claims.372
The overall impact of the St. Luke’s case has broader repercussions.
The lack of certainty about how best to design efficient health care with
lower costs and higher quality creates the possibility of mixed messages
being sent to the business community. On the one hand, greater
integration through merger or ACOs is to be encouraged. On the other
hand, the antitrust risk of such integration being blocked, not always in a
way that is predictable based on sound economic reasoning, creates
business uncertainty.
The St. Luke’s case is a missed opportunity, in light of the lack of
Supreme Court guidance on mergers, to articulate a clear and wellreasoned analysis of a merger case that encourages cost-reducing and
quality-enhancing efficiencies. The lack of clear articulation on
efficiencies has a broader impact on ACO analysis, and this lack of
clarity might push hospitals to go for an all-or-nothing approach of
acquisitions of physician groups. Similarly, lack of sophisticated
reasoning on bilateral monopoly and foreclosure suggests that gaps
remain in merger analysis in the courts that future cases must address.

369. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, The “Foreclosure” Effects of Vertical
Mergers, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 207 (1991); Janusz A. Ordover et al.,
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C.
Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995);
Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988);
Salinger, supra note 29.
370. See, e.g., Robert H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225
(1978).
371. James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Mergers Through the Agencies:
“Let’s Make a Deal,” ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 10 (noting that “the relevant guidance comes not
from the case law, the Vertical Guidelines, or modern economic theory”).
372. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement
Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619 (2013).

